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SUBSTANCE TESTING vs. WORKERS' RIGHTS:
LITIGATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
STRATEGIES TO PROTECT THE
PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYEE
DEBoRmAH STERN*
DR. J.Aims L. WEEKS**
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 23, 1987, WJLA-Washington, D.C., "News 7,"
aired a story in which it had arranged to have the longtime and
well-respected consumer lobbyist Esther Peterson, who has cele-
brated her eighty-first birthday, submit to a urine test after eating
a poppy seed bagel. The urine specimen was sent to a laboratory
for analysis. The result showed that Esther Peterson had tested pos-
itive for cocaine use. When the pronouncement was made, the news-
casters had a good laugh, Esther Peterson had a good laugh, and
the viewing public had a good laugh. The report, however, was not
at all funny. Rather, it illustrated the frightening consequences that
drug testing can have on ordinary law-abiding citizens. The Esther
Peterson story was not simply about laboratory misidentification or
mishandling of specimens, an ever-present problem in drug testing
cases, but about the underlying, fundamental inability of urinalysis
to correctly distinguish between unlawful drugs and ordinary foods.
In the District of Columbia, female job applicants to the local
police force were required to submit urine samples for drug screening
as part of the application process. If a sample tested negative, that
is, showed no trace of drug use, it was marked with a red "F",
for female, and then secretly tested for pregnancy.'
* Member of the UMWA Legal Staff, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1978, George Washington
University; J.D. 1981, George Washington University National Law Center.
** Deputy Administrator for Occupational Health, UMWA, Washington, D.C.; B.S. 1965,
University of California at Berkley; Sc.D. 1981, Harvard University School of Public Health.
1. Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1987, at A-i, col. 1.
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Suggestions that employers not only engage in drug testing of
employees, but genetic testing (using blood samples) as well, in order
to screen out applicants and employees who are prone to heart dis-
ease, Huntington's and Alzheimer's diseases, and metabolic disor-
ders, thereby reducing health insurance and other employment
burdens, have also been heard. 2
Outrageous? Incredible? A violation of our basic right to dignity
and privacy? Absolutely. Yet, employer demands that employees
provide them with their urine for screening are occurring on a daily
basis and are on the increase. Corporate America has become fixated
on the idea that urine samples hold the key to establishing a pro-
ductive, efficient work force. The "enlightened management" pro-
grams of the 1970's appear to be giving way to a "Big Brother"
mentality as big business becomes preoccupied with this latest and
most dangerous fad - substance testing of workers. Drug screening
is gaining popularity in spite of all of the evidence that drug screen-
ing cannot show when a drug was ingested or inhaled, cannot show
present impairment, and often cannot distinguish between drugs
which are unlawful or which may affect motor skill or mental al-
ertness, and drugs (or foods!) which are lawful or do not create
such hazards.
The threat that substance testing poses to the individual's rep-
utation, character, standing in the community, wage-earning poten-
tial, privacy, dignity, and peace of mind is self-evident. Yet workers
are having to battle their employers in the courtroom and at the
bargaining table to protect these fundamental rights. Those em-
ployed by federal or state government have looked to the protection
of the United States Constitution or their state constitutions to limit
employer demands that they submit to drug and alcohol tests.3 Pri-
2. Rowe, Russell-Einhorn, & Weinstein, New Issues in Testing the Work Force: Genetic Dis-
eases, 38 LAB. L.J. 518 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986), vacated,
816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 577 (1987); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986); Lovvorn v. City
of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986): Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C.
1986) rev'd, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Patchogue-Medford Congress v. Bd. of Educ., 119 A.D.2d
35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 510 N.E.2d 325 (1987).
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vate-sector employees generally are not able to assert federal con-
stitutional guarantees, and in many cases state constitutional
guarantees, against their employers. 4 They are not, however, wea-
ponless in resisting employer-mandated substance screening pro-
grams. Private-sector employees may resort to state tort actions for,
among other things, defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional
and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, wrongful discharge,
and negligence. Consistent with the principles of federal preemption
under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,5 em-
ployees covered by collective bargaining agreements are generally
confined to settling disputes with their employers through the con-
tractually established grievance-arbitration procedure. However, if
the unionized worker can show employer conduct which raises issues
that do not look to the collective bargaining agreement for reso-
lution, or which are "outrageous" or "particularly abusive," or if
the individual asserts rights which are protected by state law or pub-
lic policy extended to all employees regardless of union affiliation,
he or she might successfully avoid federal preemption and bring a
state tort action against the company. Employees, both union and
non-union, may seek protection from substance testing under the
National Labor Relations Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act, the Mine Safety
and Health Act, the Occupational Health and Safety Act, and state
workers compensation, civil rights and anti-discrimination laws, where
the manner of employer substance testing violates the guarantees
established by the particular statute.
Employees represented by a labor organization may find further
protection in the collective bargaining process. The General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board has recently confirmed that
an employer has the duty to bargain over drug screening programs.
The duty of the employer to negotiate, coupled with its duty to
provide relevant information, can provide unions with powerful tools
to curb company abuse of workers' rights in this area.
4. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
5. Labor Management Relations Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) [hereinafter LMRA].
1988]
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The purpose of this article is, first, to familiarize the reader with
the various types of substance tests currently available, and the
strengths and weaknesses of each to better enter into dialogue over
their use. Understanding how each of the testing methods work and
their reliability (or lack thereof) is essential to protecting workers
from false accusation. Next, the article discusses litigation strategies
available to private-sector employees and/or unions which represent
them. Considerable attention is given to state tort actions and the
impact of federal preemption - the potential of tort actions to yield
large damage awards make this area of litigation a particularly wor-
thy deterrent against employer excess in substance testing. Finally,
closing the article is a discussion of the duty to negotiate and provide
information under the National Labor Relations Act and suggestions
for bargaining over substance testing programs and employee as-
sistance programs which treat substance abuse.
Substance testing and employee rights is a rapidly emerging area.
The information provided herein will no doubt be augmented by
new cases and collective bargaining tactics. It is hoped, however,
that the discussion will highlight how fraught with complications
drug testing programs are. Although drug and alcohol use in the
workplace is reprehensible and intolerable, the evidence shows that
where employers rely on testing to address the problem, particularly
where there is no larger program providing for rehabilitation, the
potential for damaging the lives of the men and women that com-
prise the workforce is great, while the potential for intelligently and
effectively combating drug abuse is minimal.
II. CURRENT TECH3NOLOGY FOR SUBSTANCE TESTING
A. Background on Techniques
Screening of workers for drug use was made technically and ec-
onomically possible with the development of simple, rapid, inex-
pensive, and fairly reliable screening tests to measure the presence
of drug metabolites in urine. Gas chromatographic methods were
developed in 19736 and immunologic methods, such as the currently
6. Agurell, Gustafsson, Holmstedt, Leander, Lindgren, Nilsson, Sandberg & Asberg, "Quan-
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popular screening tests, the enzyme multiplied immunoassay tech-
nique ("EMIT"), and the radio immunoassay ("RIA"), came soon
after.7 EMIT and RIA are popular among employers testing em-
ployees for drug use because of their affordable cost, only five to
ten dollars per test. When a screening test is positive, the more
reliable gas chromatography combined with mass spectroscopy is
often used for confirmation purposes, and may cost up to four
hundred dollars per test. In order to understand the proper inter-
pretation and use of these tests, it is necessary to describe them
briefly.
The EMIT and RIA tests both employ the same chemical reaction
to detect the presence of drug metabolites (the chemical byproducts
which the body releases when it breaks down a drug) in urine. 8 The
urine sample is added to a solution containing antibodies to be tested
for a broad spectrum of drug metabolites. If the drug metabolites,
which stimulate the antibody, are present in the urine, they combine
with the antibody, forming what is known as an insoluble antigen-
antibody complex and precipitate out of the urine sample. The prin-
ciple difference between EMIT and RIA is the method of detection
of this reaction.
With RIA, the antibody contains a radioactive isotope, fre-
quently iodine, which emits a known amount of radiation and is
easily detected. If there are drug metabolites in the urine, the ra-
dioactive isotope is taken out of solution with the antigen-antibody
complex. Thus, the more drug metabolite in the original solution,
the less radioactivity in the solution after the antibody has been
added.
EMIT works somewhat differently and involves three basic steps.
First, a common enzyme is added to the urine sample which binds
to any drug metabolite. If there are no drug metabolites, it remains
dissolved in the urine. Second, a drug antibody is added to the
solution and forms the antigen-antibody complex which precipitates
out of solution, taking the enzyme with it. Third, the solution is
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then tested for enzyme activity, a relatively easy test to perform.
The more drug metabolites in the urine sample, the less enzyme
activity in the solution. If there are none, the enzyme will be active.
Although these tests sound different, they both employ the same
biochemical mechanism - the formation of an antigen-antibody
complex. And both tests are only as good as the reaction. A false
positive will occur whenever the test indicates a positive reaction
where in fact there is no drug metabolite in the urine sample. This
can occur because drug antibodies often cross-react with molecules
that are similar to the drug metabolites. Cross-reacting molecules
can come from the person's diet or prescription and non-prescription
medication (poppy seeds and codeine can give false positive for co-
caine, for example). In order to take account of this problem, a
properly conducted testing program should consider all possible
sources of cross-reactivity, including medications the persons is using
and the presence of certain food items in the diet. By necessity, this
creates a situation where medical and other information that might
otherwise be confidential to the employee will have to be disclosed
to the employer or testing service.
Another way to control the problem of false positives is to con-
duct a second test on the same sample. In order for such a con-
firmation test to be valid, it must employ a different analytical
technique. If a repeat of the same type of test were done, it merely
duplicates the reaction that gave rise to the false positive. With EMIT
and RIA, a confirmation test which depended on an antigen-anti-
body reaction would proliably also give false'positive and therefore,
a false confirmation. 9
The most common analytical procedure used to confirm im-
munologic tests is gas chromatography'0 combined with mass spec-
troscopy," commonly known as GC/MS. This is in fact two different
analytic procedures combined to complement one another.
9. Id. at 125.
10. J. CHAmB RLAN, supra note 7, at 83-94; J. ROBERTS, R. STEWART & M. CASERIO, ORGANIC
CHEamsTRY 153-56 (1971).
11. J. ROBERTS, R. STEWART & M. CASEPIO, supra note 10, at 158-59.
[Vol. 90
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Chromatography is a method of identifying the ingredients in
mixtures by separating the mixture into its constituent parts. A sim-
ple form of chromatography sometimes used to test urine samples
for drug metabolites is thin layer chromatography ("TLC"). 12 With
this procedure, a small portion of an unknown mixture (e.g., a urine
sample) is placed on a thin layer of silica gel spread on a glass plate
(hence the name, thin layer chromatography), and the edge of the
plate is stood in a suitable organic solvent. As the solvent creeps
up the plate, much the same way kerosene creeps into a lantern
wick, it dissolves the unknown mixture and spreads it. Since some
ingredients in the mixture are more soluble than others, they will
creep up the plate at different rates. The resulting pattern enables
a technician to identify whether certain chemicals (e.g., drug me-
tabolites) are present in the urine sample. This method uses relatively
inexpensive materials, is simple and accurate, but is labor intensive.
Gas chromatography is similar. Instead of a thin layer on a plate
and a solvent, it uses a suitable packing material in a tube (called
a column) and a carrier gas. 3 The unknown mixture is injected into
the column, is heated to a carefully monitored temperature sufficient
to evaporate the mixture into a gas (hence the name, gas chro-
matography), which is carried through the column by the carrier
gas. The carrier gas passes through the column and carries the un-
known mixture with it. Different ingredients are separated, de-
pending on their relative solubility. The different ingredients come
out of the column at different times, are detected by any of several
detectors, and a graph (chromatogram) is produced on a strip-chart,
with peaks and valleys. Each peak corresponds to a different in-
gredient, and its size is proportional to the amount in the mixture.
This enables both qualitative and quantitative analysis. As in the
above, since both TLC and GC employ the same chemical property,
namely, the solubility of the drug metabolite, it would not be valid
to use GC to confirm a positive test identification by TLC (or vice-
versa).
12. J. C~mBERLAN, supra note 7, at 78-82.
13. Id. at 83-94; J. ROBERTS, R. STEwAT & M. CASERiO, supra note 10, at 153-56.
1988]
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Mass spectroscopy is an analytical procedure that separates in-
gredients in a mixture on the basis of the mass of each molecule
in the mixture (hence the name, mass spectroscopy). 14 An electron
beam is used to bombard the urine sample, giving each molecule
an electric charge. The resulting charged molecules are then accel-
erated by an opposite electrical charge into a curved tube and sub-
jected to a magnetic field. As they are accelerated through the curved
tube, the heavier particles separate from the lighter ones (by cen-
trifugal force), and the final beam is directed into a collector. Since
each molecule has a unique mass it makes a unique pattern in the
collector, enabling highly specific analysis. The amount of each mol-
ecule present in an unknown solution is proportional to the electrical
charge. 15
Theoretically, either gas chromatography or mass spectroscopy
could be used alone for both qualitative and quantitative analysis.
GC is an efficient separator of ingredients in a mixture, while the
MS is a good identifier; hence they complement each other. 16 Thus,
when immunologic tests are combined with chromatographic and
mass spectroscopic techniques, compounds can be accurately and
reliably identified, since it is very unlikely that any two compounds
would bind to the same antibody, have the same solubility and the
same mass. It should be noted, however, that no matter what the
technology of the particular test may be, it cannot assure against
human error, such as mislabeling or mishandling the specimen.
B. Reliability
Are these tests reliable? In order to answer this question, it is
important first to clarify the meaning of certain technical terms used
both by analytical chemists and public health practitioners who use
screening tests. It is common to evaluate tests in terms of their
precision, accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, limit of detection and
cutoff point. When laboratories are subjected to proficiency testing,
each of these parameters is measured. Some of these terms, and
14. J. RoBERTS, R. STEWART & M. CASERIO, supra note 10, at 158-59.
15. J. ROBERTS, R. STEAwRT & M. CAsEmo, supra note 10, at 158.
16. J. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 7, at 75-114, 144.
[Vol. 90
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other, are also used by public health practitioners in order to eval-
uate screening tests in practice, but they have somewhat different
meanings, which could be the source of some confusion. Therefore,
we consider it important to clarify the meaning of these terms.
Precision is a measure of the agreement of the results between
replicate measurements.17 Accuracy, on the other hand, is a measure
of the agreement between the best estimate from an analytical pro-
cedure and a known value.18 For example, if on a target range shots
are aimed at a "bull's eye," the shots are precise as to the location
they hit but are inaccurate because they missed the intended target.
The mean value of an accurate test would be very close to the actual
value.
To the analytical chemist, sensitivity is the ability of an analytical
procedure to distinguish between different concentrations of a chem-
ical being analyzed. 19 It is often used interchangeably with the limit
of detection, but there is a subtle difference. The limit of detection
is a measure of the lowest concentration the procedure can detect.20
The cutoff point, on the other hand, is the value selected above
which a test is considered positive and below which it is considered
negative. 21 In theory, the lowest feasible cutoff point is the limit of
detection. The closer one gets to the limit of detection, the greater
is the risk of false positives. Therefore, the cutoff point is selected
at a higher concentration than the limit of detection. The selection
of a cutoff point is often driven more by practical considerations22
than anything to do with a person's physical or mental condition.
In analyzing a screening test, as opposed to the laboratory pro-
cedure, sensitivity is defined as the ability of the screening test to
detect true positives, e.g., those persons who in fact have drug me-
tabolites in their urine.23 It would be affected not only by the an-
alytical sensitivity, but also by all other sources of error as well -





22. E.g., the need to limit the number of false positives.
23. A. MopjusoN, SScRE~mNo IN CHRoNc DISEASE 10 (1985).
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external contamination, clerical error, improper calibration, etc. The
most sensitive test would detect 100% of all of the true positives.
Specificity to the analytical chemist is the ability of a method
to determine the compound it claims to measure and nothing else.
The specificity of a screening test, on the other hand, is the ability
of the test to detect true negatives, e.g., those persons who in fact
do not have drug metabolites in their urine.2 Like sensitivity, spec-
ificity is not only affected by analytical specificity but by other sources
of error as well. The most specific test would never indicate a false
positive.
While it is common to describe screening tests in terms of their
sensitivity and specificity, a better measurement of test reliability is
the "predictive value positive" ('"PV + 1).25 This measurement has
no analog in the laboratory procedure. The PV + is the proportion
of all positive tests that are in fact true positives. The higher the
PV+, up to 100%, the better the test. In practice, a test will only
show those persons who test positive - it will not show those who
test false positive. Confirmation testing may produce some surprising
results. The PV+ depends not only on the specific characteristics
of the test, but also on the prevalence (e.g., the proportion) of drug
metabolites in the population being tested. Even when using tests
with high sensitivity and specificity, if the prevalence of drug me-
tabolites in urine is low, the test's ability to detect "true positives"
will also be low. 26
An illustration should help explain this point. 27 Suppose the sen-
sitivity and specificity of a substance test are both 99%. If 2% of
a particular workforce uses drugs (these are reasonable estimates),
the predictive value positive is 67% (that is, a third of the positive
tests will be false positives). This occurs because even with a high
specificity (99%), if the vast majority of a population do not have
drug metabolites in their urine (in this case, 98%), even a small
24. Id.; Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to Employment Relations
and Employment Law, 63 Cm.[-]KENT L. REv. 683, 695-99 (1987).
25. A. MoiusoN, supra note 23, at 19.
26. Rothstein, supra note 24.
27. See also id.
[Vol. 90
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error in identifying true negatives could produce a large number of
false positives.
28
When drug screening tests are used in drug rehabilitation pro-
grams, the prevalence of drug metabolites is much higher. Using the
same illustrative values of sensitivity and specificity as above, if the
prevalence of drug metabolites is 25%, the PV+ is 97%, or 3%
false positives. When screening tests are applied outside of a health
care setting on populations where the prevalence of drug use is low,
not only do we have the potential for more than ten-fold increase
in error (from 3% to 33%), the consequences of error are grave
because the tested person's job is at stake. Therefore, the use of a
single unconfirmed screening test as the basis for any personnel ac-
tion should be summarily rejected.
This is not to say, however, that a confirmed test is therefore
valid. Confirmation tests control only one source of error - those
that occur in the analytical procedure. Other errors can and should
be controlled either with frequent checks of the laboratory instru-
ment combined with regular proficiency testing and fastidious ad-
herence to proper administrative procedure. Fastidious attention to
administrative procedure (such as carefully monitored storage, doc-
umented chain of custody, and protecting samples from contami-
nation) is not merely a technicality; it is important as a means of
preventing error. These problems are sufficiently important that a
recent text on drug testing devoted an entire chapter to quality con-
trol and good laboratory practice.
29
This is not a mere matter of principle. Empirical evaluation of
laboratory performance is clear cause for concern. One evaluation
conducted by the Centers for Disease Control of the U.S. Public
Health Service sent "blind" samples with known concentration of
drug metabolites to thirteen laboratories that regularly service meth-
adone maintenance facilities and that therefore, routinely test urine
samples for drug use. Depending on the drug (marijuana was not
28. Wells, Halperin & Thun, The Predictive Value of Screening for Illicit Drugs in the Work-
place, 78 Amt. J. Pun. HEAlTH .(1988).
29. J. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 7, at ch. 8.
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included), this investigation found very high error rates, particularly
for false negatives but also for false positives.30
A similar published investigation conducted by the American As-
sociation for Clinical Chemistry, a professional association repre-
senting many laboratories in the U.S., reported different results. Out
of 1,832 samples containing known amounts of drug metabolites
that were sent to 47 laboratories, only one false positive was reported
and 14 false negatives. Marijuana, cocaine and four other drugs were
included in the samples. This was not a "blind" investigation, how-
ever, since samples were shipped in special glass bottles rather than
in the usual plastic containers, and therefore, were known to the
laboratory staff to be part of a proficiency testing effort. Moreover,
the labs that participated in the study were selected to include those
that already participated in the AACC's quality control program
and that had the technical capability to perform both screening and
confirmatory testing. Thus, some of the more error-prone labora-
tories could have been selected out. This study was specifically de-
signed to counter negative publicity concerning routine drug testing
of workers and illustrates that in order to obtain reliable results,
samples should only be sent to labs that regularly participate in
outside quality control programs and that have the capability of
performing their own confirmatory testing. 31
A more focused evaluation concerned field testing of EMIT and
RIA testing of marijuana metabolites confirmed with GC/MS. This
investigation, conducted by the U.S. Army, found a false positive
rate of 4% and a false negative rate of 10%. This corresponds to
a sensitivity of 90%o and a specificity of 96%.32 These rates are
somewhat higher than those reported by the test manufacturers and
represent actual field conditions rather than those obtainable from
an ideal laboratory. The consequences for PV + are significant. With
sensitivity of 9007o and specificity of 96%, if the population prey-
30. Hansen, Caudill, & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing: Results of a CDC Blind Study, 253 J.
A.M.A. 2382 (1985).
31. Frings, White, & Battaglia, Status of Drugs-of-Abuse Testing in Urine: An AACC Study,
33 CtnacAL CHasmTRY 1683 (1987).
32. Abercrombie & Jewell, Evaluation of EMIT and RIA High Volume Test Procedures for
THC Metabolites in Urine Utilizing GC/MS Confirmation, 10 J. ANALYTicAL ToXICOLO0Y 178 (1986).
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alence is 2%, the PV+ is 31%, i.e., 69% of positive tests are false
positives.
C. Value
Even if a test for drug metabolites is valid, however, does a
positive test really provide valuable information? In order to answer
this question, it is important to discuss briefly what happens to drugs
(or any substance) in the body so that we will know what is being
tested and what it means. Whenever a drug enters the body, it pro-
vokes a series of chemical reactions and in turn is acted on by the
body's own chemistry. The most common reactions (called metab-
olism) occur when food is digested and transformed into the ulti-
mately useful chemicals that are needed to sustain life.
Drugs that alter the state of mind are classified as psychoactive
drugs. Alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, amphetamines, and others are
all psychoactive drugs and while that drug is present in the person's
body, the person's state of mind is altered. This could affect his or
her response time, attentiveness, mood, consciousness, and so on.
When drugs are acted on by the body's own chemistry, the drug
is broken down into metabolites that are eliminated in the feces,
urine, or exhaled breath. Drug metabolites may, or may not, them-
selves be psychoactive substances. The metabolic rate varies from
individual to individual and from drug to drug. Depending on the
metabolic rate and other factors, a drug metabolite may be present
even when the original psychoactive drug has been rendered com-
pletely inactive. An important point concerning drug tests is that
they are unable to detect exclusively the presence of the psychoactive
drug; non-psychoactive metabolites are detected also. Therefore, they
do not and cannot give any unambiguous indication of whether the
person was under the influence of the tested drug at the time the
urine sample was given. They do not measure impairment; they only
indicate use.
Considering the importance of this point, we will discuss it in
some detail as it relates to the two most commonly tested drugs,
marijuana and cocaine. The psychoactive chemical in marijuana is
known as delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (delta-9-THC). It is metab-
19881
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olized first into 1 1-OH-delta-9-THC (which is also psychoactive) then
into 1 1-nor-delta-9-THC and 9-carboxy-THC. The first two com-
pounds are metabolized within an hour. The last two metabolites
reach measurable concentrations in blood serum within an hour after
smoking and may be detected up to four weeks later in the urine
of chronic users. Approximately two-thirds are eliminated in the
feces; the remainder, in the urine. Neither 1 1-nor-delta-9-THC, nor
9-carboxy-THC are psychoactive. EMIT and RIA detect the presence
of all these compounds, yet the latter two are much more likely to
be found, unless a urine sample is taken within an hour after the
person consumes marijuana. 33
A similar situation holds with cocaine. Cocaine itself is the psy-
choactive substance. It is metabolized almost completely from three
to six hours after consumption. Some of its psychoactive effects
could be caused by its metabolites. One of its major metabolites is
benzoylecgonine which can be found in blood serum up to 24 hours
following consumption. Benzoylecgonine is not psychoactive; EMIT
and RIA both detect this metabolite.3 4
III. DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES
An important motivation in promoting drug testing is the as-
sumption that drug use is a contributing factor to occupational in-
juries. The logic is clear enough: The use of alcohol - a mind-
altering substance - is known to be a contributing factor to injuries
and fatalities. Therefore, use of drugs - also mind-altering sub-
stances - must, by analogy, contribute to occupational injuries.
Such reasoning by analogy arises because of the absence of any
empirical investigations concerning drug use and occupational in-
juries. The logic continues: If we can find the drug users (with drug
33. See Schwartz & Hawks, Laboratory Detection of Mariuana Use, 254 J. A.M.A. 788 (1985);
Urine Testing for Detection of Marijuana: An Advisory, 32 MORmITY & MORTAITY WEEKLY REP.
469 (1983).
34. See Jatlow, Van Dyke, Barash & Byck, Measurement of Benzoylecgonine and Cocaine in
Urine: Separation of Various Cocaine Metabolites Using Reversed-Phase High Performance Liquid
Chromatography, 152 J. CHROMATOGRAPHY 115 (1978); Misra, Nayak, Block, & Mule, Estimation
and Disposition of [3H Benzoylecgonine and Pharmacological Activity of Some Cocaine Metabolites,
27 J. PHARMAcy & PHARMACOLOGY 784 (1985).
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testing), we can reduce the risk of injuries on the job. While the
logic appears sound, it is seriously flawed and is not supported by
empirical findings. We will examine both the logic and data.
To begin, we should summarize the evidence concerning alcohol
consumption and injuries and distinguish between acute alcohol in-
toxication and chronic alcohol abuse. Acute alcohol intoxication is
well known to be strongly associated with many different causes of
fatalities such as automobile crashes, burns, drownings, falls, and
poisonings.35 Chronic alcohol abuse is also associated with risk of
fatal injuries though it is unclear whether this is because chronic
alcoholics are more likely to be acutely intoxicated or whether chronic
alcohol abuse itself is a contributing factor to injuries.
One logical inference to draw from these facts is that if acute
and chronic alcohol intoxication are known contributing factors to
a wide spectrum of injuries, that wide spectrum should include oc-
cupational injuries. Is this in fact the case? There are few investi-
gations of this question. Three studies of occupational fatalities in
which victims were examined at autopsy for alcohol intoxication (a
blood alcohol concentration ["BAC"] greater than 0.10%) revealed
that from 2% to 5% of occupational fatalities not involving moving
vehicles were associated with BAC greater than 0.10%. 36 From 6%
to 14% of fatalities in which a moving vehicle was involved had
BAC greater than 0.10%, 37 In contrast, in 40% of all motor vehicle
fatalities, victims have BAC greater than 0.10%.38
35. See Brenner, Alcoholism and Fatal Accidents, 23 Q. J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 517 (1967);
Dietz & Baker, Drowning: Epidemiology and Prevention, 64 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 303 (1974); J. FEL
& T. KLEIN, THE NAruRE OF THE REDUCTION IN ALCOHOL IN U.S. FATAL CRASHES (Society of Au-
tomotive Engineers Technical Paper Series No. 860038, 1986); P. HABERMAN & M. BADEN, ALCOHOL,
OTHER DRUGS AND VIOLENT DEATH (1978), Sikes, Alcohol and Fatal Injuries-Fulton County, Georgia,
1982, 32 MoRIDnITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 573 (1983); Tashiro & Pipscomb, Mortality Experience
of Alcoholics, 24 Q. J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 203 (1963); Waller, Nonhighway Injury Fatalities-I. The
Roles of Alcohol and Problem Drinking, Drugs, and Medical Impairment, 25 J. CHRONIC DISEASES
33 (1972).
36. See Parkinson, Gauss, Peper & Elliott, Traumatic Workplace Deaths in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, 1983 and 1984, 28 J. OccuP. MED. 100 (1986); Copeland, Fatal Occupational Accidents-
The Five-Year Metro Dade County Experience, 1979-1983, 30 J. FORENSIC ScI. 494 (1985); Baker,
Samkoff, Fisher & Van Buren, Fatal Occupational Injuries, 248 J. A.M.A. 692 (1982).
37. Id.
38. Fell & Klein, supra note 35.
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There has been some attempt to document the contribution of
alcohol or drug use in the mining industry (coal and metal/non-
metal), but with little success. The Federal Mine Safety and Health
Administration fatality reports from 1979 to 1985 were examined to
find instances where alcohol or drugs were apparent contributing
factors. Out of 1,272 fatalities39 in this period, nine (0.7Wo) were
associated with alcohol or drug use confirmed at autopsy. 40 Con-
sistent with findings reported above, the majority occurred with
moving vehicles. Only one person was tested for drug use, with a
negative result, and there was circumstantial evidence of drug use
in one other. Acute alcohol intoxication was documented in seven
of the nine victims. 4' Therefore, one logical connection - that acute
alcohol intoxication is a significant contributing factor to occupa-
tional fatalities - is not supported by empirical research.
The author could find only three investigations of the association
of either acute or chronic alcohol abuse and non-fatal occupational
injuries in the published scientific literature. One of them42 found
that chronic alcoholics had about twice the risk of occupational
injury compared to others. Another43 found the same magnitude of
risk for persons who consumed, on the average, about five drinks
per day and no association with chronic abuse. A third study44 re-
viewed consecutive traumatic injury admissions to a hospital emer-
gency room and examined them for BAC. Of the 1,045 injuries that
occurred at work, 12.5070 had measurable (i.e., some evidence of)
BAC compared to 560/0 among traffic accident injuries and 11.2%
39. Data on the number of fatalities in the mining industry (coal and metal/non-metal mines)
were obtained from the MINE SAFr & HEALTH ADmsNisRAnoN, MINE INJURIES AND WORKTIME
QUARTERy REPORT (closeout ed. 1979-85).
40. Id. Individual fatality reports, prepared by the Mine Safety and Health Administration,
were obtained for fatalities in which there were evidence of drugs or alcohol abuse. A total of nine
such reports were obtained for the period 1979 through 1985.
41. Id., see also Criteria for Evaluating Drug Testing of Miners, Presentation of Dr. James
Weeks, 18th Annual Inst. on Coal Mine Health, Safety & Research, Va. Poly. & St. U. (Aug. 25,
1987) (proceedings in press).
42. Observer & Maxwell, A Study of Absenteeism, Accidents, and Sickness Payments in Prob-
lem Drinkers in One Industry, 20 Q. J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 302 (1959).
43. Hingson, Lederman & Walsh, Employee Drinking Patterns and Accidental Injury: A Study
of Four New England States, 46 Q. J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 298 (1985).
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among a control group of persons admitted elsewhere in the hospital.
Thus there is a small positive association between acute alcohol
intoxication use and non-fatal occupational injuries. The one in-
vestigation that considered the effects of chronic alcohol abuse and
injuries found a two-fold increase in risk. Therefore the logical con-
nection - that alcohol is a contributing factor to occupational in-
juries - is weakly supported. If one is to reason by analogy, then
the premise that drugs contribute to occupational injuries must have
an equally weak foundation.
The assumption that finding drug users with drug testing will
reduce occupational injuries is also flawed. Because of the nature
of drug tests, i.e., their ability to detect only prior use rather than
impairment, they cannot distinguish between casual use, chronic
abuse, or acute intoxication. The choice of terms is important: they
only measure use of drugs, they do not measure abuse. According
to surveys published by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, so-
called recreational users outnumber chronic users by 5: 1.4
To summarize, drug testing involves highly technical, but not
necessarily highly reliable, procedures. An employer that utilizes drug
screening of employees, given the risk of wrongly accusing innocent
employees, and the probability of false positives or negatives, cannot
be assured that it will accurately reveal those employees who use
drugs. Additionally, the evidence that drug use causes injuries or
safety hazards simply is not there. An employer who insists on get-
ting into the murky subject of substance screening cannot be certain
that it will gain much in productivity or safety. It can assume, how-
ever, that it will cause its employees to undergo test procedures
which yield only questionable information.
IV. POTENTIAL EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SUBSTANCE TESTING OF
EMPLOYEES
An employer who institutes a substance testing program is not
merely concerned with a productive, safe workplace. That goal can
be achieved by exercising managerial authority to discharge or dis-
45. Kozel & Adams, Epidemiology of Drug Abuse: An Overview, 234 Science 970 (1986).
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cipline employees who do not meet the company's productivity re-
quirements or who perform in an unsafe manner. Rather, by
instituting a substance testing program, the employer takes it upon
itself to determine the underlying reason for the worker's lack of
productivity or safe work habits. In the case of random or massive
substance testing, the employer seeks information concerning em-
ployee substance use for its own sake, without necessarily having
reason to test. Most significantly, the reliability of current testing
methods is far from assured, due both to technical problems with
the tests and human error. Thus, there is the ever-present possibility
that screening will fail to detect those persons who are unlawful
substance users and falsely accuse innocent persons who do not un-
lawfully use drugs.
The assault which substance testing mounts against the privacy
and dignity of the adult men and women who make up the work-
force creates fertile ground for litigation. Tort actions may arise
where inaccurate testing results lead to character assassination, def-
amation, invasion of privacy, emotional distress, and wrongful dis-
charge. Even if a screening program manages to respect the
fundamental human rights of the workers, it must also be carried
out in a manner which does not violate the multitude of federal and
state laws which protect workers from employment discrimination
because of race, sex, ethnic origin, religion, gender, handicap, or
union affiliation. It cannot violate the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act or Occupational Safety and Health Act. And discharge for drug
or alcohol use may result in eligibility for workers' compensation
benefits if the employee developed the dependency as a result of
employment-related injury or stress. When an employer subjects its
employees to mandatory substance testing, it opens itself up to po-
tential liability in these various areas of law.
A. State Tort Liability
Due to the invasive nature of substance testing, and the often
underlying accusation that the employee being tested is a substance
abuser, employer drug and alcohol screening programs will most
assuredly give rise to private state tort actions. The tort actions most
commonly brought by employees against their employers are for
[Vol. 90
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wrongful discharge, invasion of privacy, defamation, and/or inten-
tional/negligent infliction of emotional distress. As illustrated below,
successful tort actions have yielded considerable damage awards ren-
dered by sympathetic juries.
When an employee is discharged for alleged substance abuse, he
or she may be faced not only with disclosure of the accusation to
fellow co-workers or management personnel, but disclosure to pro-
spective employers as the individual searches for a new job. If the
charge is untrue, is communicated to someone other than the dis-
charged employee, and tends to harm his reputation or lower his
standing in the estimation of the community, the individual may
have grounds for bringing a defamation action in state court. 46 Even
if the employer communicates the defamatory statement to the em-
ployee only, if the employee, in seeking out new employment, is
compelled to communicate the defamatory statement to the pro-
spective employer, the discharging employer may be held liable for
defamation. 47
In a relatively early case to emerge in the drug testing contro-
versy, Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Wherry,48 an employee dis-
charged after testing "positive" for drugs successfully sued his
employer for defamation in Texas state court. Upon sustaining an
injury on the job, Wherry underwent a drug test ordered by the
company. The analysis showed traces of methadone use in an amount
insufficient to evidence drug abuse. The company physician reported
to management the drug testing result, and the superintendent who
received the report subsequently circulated a memorandum among
several company officials advising that Wherry had tested positive
for methadone use, and that methadone was a synthetic drug com-
46. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986). West Virginia
courts have recognized a private cause of action for defamation where the injurious false statement
is negligently published to a third party and is not privileged. Crump v. Beckley Newspaper, Inc.,
320 S.E.2d 70 (V. Va. 1984).
47. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d 876; McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452, 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969); First State
Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980); Colonial Stores v. Barrett, 38 S.E.2d 306 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1946).
48. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976), appeal
dismissed, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
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monly used to assist withdrawal from heroin addiction.49 A second
urinalysis was run which indicated that Wherry showed the presence
of a compound in his system resembling methadone, but that the
compound was not in itself methadone or any other illicit drug.
Although Wherry was officially discharged for being an unsafe em-
ployee, the company informed the Veteran's Administration, from
whom Wherry had sought assistance in challenging the dismissal,
that Wherry had been fired for violating its rule against the use of
intoxicants and narcotics. Based on the report circulated to company
officials and the accusation of drug use made to the Veteran's Ad-
ministration, Wherry brought a state tort action for inter alia def-
amation against Houston Belt and individual management personnel.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Wherry against both the
company and particular company officials. On appeal, the Texas
Civil Court of Appeals vacated the judgment against the individual
defendants, but sustained the judgment rendered against Houston
Belt. The appellate court held that the jury properly found that the
report published to various company officials, and the statements
made to the Veteran's Administration implied, falsely, that Wherry
was a heroin or methadone user. Like the West Virginia courts, 0
the Texas Civil Court of Appeals required the plaintiff to show that
the defendant had published the defamatory statements negligently
and that actual injury resulted.5 1 Finding that both elements had
been satisfied, the appellate court sustained the jury's award of
$150,000 to Wherry based on the injury to his character or repu-
tation, the mental anguish he suffered, and the financial injury to
his occupation because of the company's false accusation of nar-
cotics use.5 2
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit upheld a jury award of $448,200 in damages to an employee
discharged by his employer for illicit use of drugs. In O'Brien v.
Papa Gino's,53 employee O'Brien was required to submit to a pol-
49. Id. at 746.
50. See Crump, 320 S.E.2d 70.
51. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d at 752.
52. Id. at 753.
53. O'Brien v. Papa Gino's, 780 F.2d 1067 (lst Cir. 1986).
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ygraph test upon being confronted by his supervisor with the rumor
that he used illegal drugs. After the polygraph test indicated that
his denial of using drugs was untrue, O'Brien was discharged. O'Brien
filed a complaint against Papa Gino's in state court4 alleging, inter
alia, that the company had defamed him by stating that his discharge
was due to unlawful drug use, and had invaded his privacy by forc-
ing him to submit to a polygraph test.55 O'Brien based the allegations
on evidence that his discharge was motivated not only by the results
of the polygraph test, but by a grudge held against him for failing
to promote the son of his supervisor, and that the polygraph test
required him to respond to questions unrelated to his employment
and private in nature.
The First Circuit upheld the jury's finding that the company, by
concealing that one reason for O'Brien's discharge was his failure
to promote the supervisor's son, defamed him by failing to state
the entire truth in dismissing him.5 6 The court rejected the employer's
defense that the statement given for O'Brien's discharge, even if
only partially true, was conditionally privileged because it was made
in the context of their employment relationship. Rather, the court
found that Papa Gino acted with malice because it was aware that
the stated reason of drug use as the cause for discharge was not
entirely true, thereby forfeiting any privilege it could otherwise
claim.57
As the O'Brien and Wheery cases illustrate, an employer who
confuses a positive drug test with sure and certain evidence of em-
ployee drug use risks liability for defamation. Although the em-
ployment relationship may confer a qualified privilege upon the
employer to make statements about the employee related to job per-
formance and other employment matters, the qualified privilege may
be lost if the employer's accusation of drug abuse is made with
54. The complaint was filed in Hillsborough County Superior Court of the State of New Hamp-
shire, and was subsequently removed by the defendant to federal court.
55. O'Brien, 780 F.2d at 1071.
56. Id. at 1073.
57. Id. at 1074.
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malice or ill will, or with the knowledge that the statement does not
reflect the entire truth.58
Drug screening, by its very nature, gives the employer access to
information about not only the illegal drugs an employee might be
taking, but lawful prescription or over-the-counter medications which
may not affect job performance. Thus, not only does substance
testing invade the individual's privacy as to matters which might be
arguably relevant to his employment, such as the use of narcotics
which impair motor skills, but also reveals information that may
have no relation to employment issues, such as the use of prescribed
medication for blood pressure, heart disease, or depression.
This intrusiveness invites tort litigation for invasion of privacy.
In O'Brien v. Papa Gino's,5 9 the jury returned a damage award
against the employer for almost a half a million dollars due, in part,
to its finding that the polygraph examination administered to test
O'Brien for drug use was highly offensive to a reasonable person
and invasive of O'Brien's privacy 0 A legally protected interest in
privacy has long been recognized in West Virginia, which, if un-
lawfully invaded, may result in an award of damages. 6 1 In the case
of Roach v. Harper,6 2 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia recognized that:
'the right of privacy' has been defined as the right of an individual to be let
alone, to live a life of seclusion, or to be free from unwarranted publicity . . .
The right of privacy is closely related to many other subjects of law, e.g., libel
and slander, literary property, wrongful search and seizure, compulsory physical
examination and eavesdropping.. . Though different in some respects from such
subjects, the right of privacy is an individual right that should be held inviolate.
58. See also Lewis, 389 N.W.2d 876, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that where
an employer's defamatory statements against a discharged employee were motivated by ill will, the
qualified privilege had been abused and was therefore lost as a defense.
59. O'Brien, 780 F.2d 1067.
60. Id. at 1072. On appeal, the First Circuit rejected the employer's contention that by accepting
employment under the terms of the company's Personnel Manual, which forbade drug use, O'Brien
had "contracted away" his right to privacy and had impliedly acquiesced to investigation of drug
use. The court noted that even if implied consent could be found, the jury may have determined that
by utilizing a polygraph examination to screen for drug use, the company exceeded the scope of any
permission O'Brien had given.
61. See Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959).
62. Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
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To hold otherwise, under modern means of communication, hearing devices, pho-
tography, and other technological advancements, would effectively deny valuable
rights of freedoms to the individual.
63
The West Virginia legislature has been sufficiently concerned with
protecting the privacy of employees to enact a statute prohibiting
the use of employer-administered polygraph tests.64 Consistent with
the principle that employees, whether union or "at-will, possess a
right of privacy vis-a-vis their employer," the West Virginia Supreme
Court has rejected the notion that an employer may investigate or
police the moral conduct of its employees, unless the conduct in
question directly affects the job responsibilities of the employee.6 1
In Golden v. Board of Educ. of the County of Harrison6 6 the Court
held that the discharge of a high school guidance counselor for
"immorality" improperly intruded upon the teacher's right of pri-
vacy, absent a showing that the alleged "immoral conduct" affected
the counselor's fitness to perform her job, or had become the "sub-
ject of such notoriety" as to significantly impair her ability to dis-
charge her professional responsibilities.67
In accord is the Texas Court of Appeals which in K-Mart Corp.
Store No. 7741 v. Trotti,6 8 recognized the right of private-sector
employees to be free, for reasons of privacy, from employer search
of personal possessions.
6 9
63. Id. at 876, 105 S.E.2d at 569.
64. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5(d) (1984). An employer may not require or request, either directly
or indirectly, that an employee or job applicant submit to a polygraph, lie detector, or similar ex-
amination to measure physiological reactions to evaluate truthfulness. The statute makes it unlawful
for an employer knowingly to allow the results of a polygraph or related test administered outside
of West Virginia to determine whether to hire a job applicant or continue employing an individual.
The polygraph statute embodies the state's understanding that economic necessity (that is, the need
to obtain and retain employment) may compel an employee to relinquish his right to privacy and
submit to the offending examination. Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W.
Va. 1984). The statute makes exception for employees who manufacture, distribute or dispense drugs,
or who are employed by the law enforcement agencies or military forces of West Virginia.
65. Cordle, 325 S.E.2d 111.
66. Golden v. Board of Educ., 169 W. Va. 63, 285 S.E.2d 665 (1981).
67. Id. at 69, 285 S.E.2d at 669.
68. K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 686 S.W.2d
593 (Tex. 1985).
69. Id. at 636-36. The appellate court reversed the lower court and remanded on the grounds,
inter alia, that the trial court had failed to include, in its definition of invasion of privacy to the
jury, the instruction that the intentional intrusion upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion must have
been highly offensive to a reasonable person.
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By analogy, substance testing is no less invasive than a polygraph
test, a locker search, or an employer's investigation into the morals
of its employees. It seeks information which an individual may pre-
fer to remain confidential. Further, because an employer already
has the authority to dismiss or discipline an employee who fails to
perform adequately or safely, its insistence on determining the rea-
sons for the employee's performance problems raises particularly
sensitive privacy problems.
An employer's accusation of substance abuse, the demand that
he or she provide a urine sample, and the potential dissemination
of such personal information to co-workers or supervisors, may place
the employee under such emotional stress, and subject the individual
to such harassment and humiliation, as to give rise to an action for
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. 70 Numerous
courts have accepted the principle that an employer may be liable,
under the theory of tortious infliction of emotional distress, for
conduct toward an employee that is outrageous or sufficiently abu-
sive to cause the individual to suffer mental anguish. 7' The related
tort of outrage is established where the plaintiff suffers emotional
distress from the defendant's outrageous conduct. 72
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in Rice v. United States Ins.
Co., 73 held that an employee who alleged a pattern of employer
harassment to pressure her to take disability leave, which resulted
in her suffering a miscarriage, stated a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. In Moniodis v. Cook,74 the Maryland
70. See, e.g., Paradis v. United Technologies, 672 F. Supp. 67 (D. Conn. 1987) (state court
is appropriate forum in which employee may bring action for emotional distress based on employer's
harassment of him and retaliation against him for his refusal to divulge names of co-workers using
drugs after he had completed employee assistance program.)
71. Four elements establish the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) The de-
fendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress or was certain or was substantially
certain that such distress would result from his conduct; (2) the conduct was so extreme and outrageous
as to exceed "all possible bounds of decency" and must be regarded as atrocious, and utterly in-
tolerable in a civilized community; (3) the actions of the defendants caused the plaintiff's emotional
distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable man
could be expected to endure it. RPsTATBMENT (S-co'rD) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
72. Id.
73. Rice v. United Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. 1984).
74. Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (1985).
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state court upheld a jury award of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, in the amount of $1,300,000, to an employee who brought a
suit against her employer for, inter alia, intentional infliction of
emotional distress resulting from the company's demand that she
submit to a polygraph examination, in violation of state statute, or
face transfer and diminished work hours. The court found that ev-
idence that the employee subsequently, and consequently, suffered
from extreme nervousness after the polygraph incident (notwith-
standing her pre-existing nervous condition), took increased doses
of medication, and found daily tasks difficult to perform, supported
a jury conclusion that the company's conduct "went far beyond the
realm of 'petty oppressions' and amounted to a complete denial of
[the individual's] dignity as a person" sufficient to cause her severe
distress. 75 Other courts have also recognized state actions brought
by employees alleging emotional distress inflicted by an employer,
e.g., where a company nurse brought suit after her manager yelled
and screamed at her in the presence of other employees and accused
her of thievery in the course of the discharge; 76 where an employee
alleged that her employer, knowing of her weakened condition due
to surgery and pending divorce proceedings, publicly and falsely
accused her of dishonesty and theft, thereby aggravating her existing
condition and causing her to suffer mental anguish, grief, humili-
ation and worry;n where a discharged attorney alleged that his law
office summarily dismissed him, ejected him from his office, and
denied him access to his personal files and belongings; 78 where com-
pany security guards interrogated an employee in a small, window-
less room for over three hours based on scant evidence that the
individual had stolen merchandise;7 9 and where an employee alleged
that the company harassed and humiliated him before others in re-
taliation for his refusal to falsify work reports.1°
75. Id. at 18, 494 A.2d at 221.
76. Meierer v. DuPont, 607 F. Supp. 1170 (D.S.C. 1985), rev'd, 792 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1986).
77. Rhodes Sun Electric Corp., 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2203, 2204 (D.N. Il. 1985).
78. Moeller v. Fuselier, Ott & McKee, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2600 (Miss. 1984).
79. Smithson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 63 Or. App. 423, 664 P.2d 1119 (1983).
80. Milton v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 101 Ill. App. 3d 75, 427 N.E.2d 829 (1981). Cf. Rawson
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982) (Allegation that employer "willfully,
wantonly, and maliciously fired" employee and would not allow him to resign "with dignity" did
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The mental pain and suffering caused by an employee discharged
for positive substance test or accused of drug or alcohol abuse will
undoubtedly give rise to an increasing number of actions alleging
tortious infliction of emotional distress. Where an employer requires
an unconsenting employee to submit to substance screening without
probable cause, disciplines or discharges an employee who has no
history of drug abuse or job performance problems solely for a
positive drug test, or fails to keep confidential an employee's sub-
stance test results or participation in a substance rehabilitation pro-
gram, it faces the likelihood that the employee will bring the
emotional distress action before a sympathetic jury.
In addition to the torts of defamation, invasion of privacy, and
infliction of emotional distress, an employer who fails to accurately
maintain employee records related to substance testing or rehabil-
itation may risk liability for negligence." A laboratory that fails to
accurately analyze a urine sample and reports a "false positive,"
or confuses the identities of urine samples and attributes a positive
result from one employee's urine sample to another employee, is
potentially liable for failure to exercise its duty of due care.82 If the
mistaken test analysis causes the employee to be disciplined, dis-
charged, or otherwise suffer reduced employment status, the lab-
oratory may be faced with the injured employee's cause of action
for tortious interference with business relationships. 3
B. The Federal Preemption Doctrine
Unlike at-will employees, employees covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement will, as a general rule, be required to settle their
disputes with the signatory employer under the grievance-arbitration
procedure established by the labor agreement. Resolution of any
not, without more, state a cause for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Allegations must set
forth pattern of employer conduct intended to cause, or recklessly causing, severe emotional ,istress).
81. See, e.g., Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1974) (recognized a duty of
an employer to use due care in keeping and maintaining employment records).
82. Id.
83. See Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co., 661 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
991 (1982); Moeller, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2600; Haupt v. International Harvester Co., 582 F. Supp.
545 (N.D. Il1. 1984); Sorrells v. Garfinkel's, 2 I.E.R. Cases 618 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1987).
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continuing dispute over the arbitrator's award, or the meaning and
interpretation of the labor agreement's terms, lies with the federal
courts whose jurisdiction derives from Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA")
8 4
Section 301 of the LMRA establishes the jurisdiction of United
States District Courts over "suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry effecting commerce . . ." and provides the framework from
which the courts fashion federal law to govern disputes arising out
of collective bargaining agreements.85 Section 301 was enacted to
ensure that federal labor law developed uniformly and that em-
ployer-union contracts were not subjected to inconsistent local rules,
or competing state and federal legal systems . 6 The concern for a
single forum for interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
saw the development of the federal preemption doctrine, whereby
suits alleging violations of labor contracts were preserved to the
federal courts, pursuant to Section 301 of the LMRA.
8 7
In the more recent case of Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck 8 the United
States Supreme Court held that an employee's state-law tort action
against his employer and its insurer for bad faith delay in making
disability payments, which were disbursed in accordance with the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, was preempted by federal
labor law; resolution of the tort claim was substantially dependent
upon analysis of the labor agreement.8 9 The court held that not only
does the LMRA preempt suits brought in state court alleging viol-
ations of a collective bargaining agreement, but it also preempts suits
alleging matters that rely upon the relationships created by a col-
lective bargaining agreement. 90 Thus, ruled the Court, state-law rights
and obligations which do not exist independently of the collective
bargaining contract, and can therefore be waived or altered by agree-
84. LMRA § 301 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
85. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
86. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
87. Id.
88. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
89. Id. at 221.
90. Id. at 210 (citing Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212, 224-25 (1983)).
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ment of the parties, are preempted under Section 301. If the eval-
uation of the state tort claim is "inextricably intertwined with
consideration of the terms of the labor contract," or if "state tort
law purports to define the meaning of the contractual relationship,"
the state action will be preempted. 9'
The Court was careful to point out that not every dispute con-
cerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, is preempted:
Section 301 on its face says nothing about the substance of what private parties
may agree to in a labor contract. Nor is there any suggestion that Congress, in
adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of private agreements
the force of federal law, ousting inconsistent state regulation. Such a rule of law
would delegate to unions and unionized employers the power to exempt themselves
from whatever state labor standards they disfavored. Clearly § 301 does not grant
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement the ability to contract what is
illegal under state law. In extending the preemptive effect of § 301 beyond suits
for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under
that section to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and
obligations, independent of a labor contract.9
The Supreme Court's willingness in Allis-Chambers to distinguish
tort claims "inextricably intertwined" with consideration of terms
of the collective bargaining agreement from tort claims which raise
"non-negotiable state-law rights of employers or employees inde-
pendent of any right established by contract" 93 is consistent with its
long-standing recognition that the existence of a collective bargaining
agreement and the availability of labor arbitration, in and of itself,
will not necessarily bar an individual employee from bringing a cause
of action based on rights arising under state law "designed to pro-
vide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers." 94 In
the most recent case of Caterpillar, Inc. v. Cecil Williams,95 the
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Bren-
nan, held that complaints filed by unionized bargaining unit em-
91. Id. at 216-17.
92. Id. at 211-12 (footnotes omitted).
93. Id. at 213.
94. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981). See also Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 107 S. Ct. 1410 (1987); McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284
(1984); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
95. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987).
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ployees in state court, alleging that the employer's plant closing
breached individual oral and written employment contracts prom-
ising indefinite employment, did not state causes of action under
Section 301 of the LMRA and were therefore, not removable to
federal court.9 6 In so holding, the Supreme Court reiterated the right
of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement to assert
legal rights arising independent of the labor contract, and rejected
Caterpillar's contention that Section 301 required that all matters
related to the employment relationship between unionized employees
and the employer be resolved through the bargaining process, within
the framework of federal law.
97
As a general rule, courts recognize that an employee's state court
claim against an employer will not be preempted by Section 301 of
the LMRA where the employer's conduct is "particularly abusive"
or "outrageous". 98
96. Id. at 2426. The federal district court had held that removal of the state actions was ap-
propriate in light of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement, and dismissed the complaints
when the plaintiff-employees refused to amend them to state a cause under the LMRA. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the actions were improperly
removed because the state law claims were not grounded, either directly or indirectly, upon rights or
liabilities created by the collective bargaining agreement.
97. Id. at 2432 n.10. The individual agreements between the employees and Caterpillar were
entered into before the employees became members of the bargaining unit. The determination that
the state causes of action were not preempted was based not on their "pre-bargaining unit" status,
however, but rather on the Court's finding that resolution of matters raised under the alleged individual
agreements was not "substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement." In-
deed, the Court noted that the plaintiff-employees, as "bargaining unit members at the time of the
plant closing, possessed substantial rights under the collective agreement, and could have brought suit
under § 301. As masters of the complaint, however, they chose not to do so." Id. at 2431.
Just several days prior to Williams, the Supreme Court issued Fort Halifax Pkg. Co. v. Coyne,
107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987), wherein it held that a course of action brought by employees under a state
statute, requiring payment of compensation by an employer relocating or terminating operations, was
not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act because the minimum labor standards established
under the state law did not intrude impermissibly upon the collective bargaining process.
98. In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977), the United States
Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations Act did not preempt a tort action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress under California law, where the plaintiff alleged a pattern of union
harassment and humiliation for complaining about discriminatory hiring hall referrals. The Court
reasoned that although relief for alleged discriminatory conduct could be found under the NLRA,
relief for the "outrageous and particularly abusive" manner of conduct could properly be sought in
state court for emotional distress. The Court cautioned, however, that the state tort action was not
the proper vehicle to attack or redress the underlying discrimination. Id. at 305.
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The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
recently held in Paradis v. United Technologies9 that a state tort
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress may be brought
by a unionized employee against an employer for harassing him in
the course of a drug-related investigation. The case arose when the
employee, Bruce Paradis, confided in company officials that he suf-
fered from drug addiction and entered the company's confidential
employee assistance program. Although United Technologies had
assured employees that they would not be retaliated or discriminated
against for having previously abused drugs or alcohol, when Paradis
requested to be transferred to avoid confronting former employees
with whom he had used drugs, the company began a campaign of
harassment, and finally discharge, to pressure Paradis to divulge
their identity. 1°°
Paradis responded by filing an action in Hartford Superior Court
(which United Technologies removed to federal district court) al-
leging defendant's infliction of emotional distress by extreme and
outrageous behavior, tortious wrongful discharge in contravention
of public policy, invasion of privacy and the right to free speech
in violation of state statute, fraud, deceit, and intentional or neg-
ligent misrepresentation. 0
Judge Peter C. Dorsey, writing for the District Court, likened
the preemption doctrine to a line spectrum which on one end is
balanced by "claims indisputedly linked to the bargaining agree-
ment," and "claims completely independent of and unrelated to the
collective bargaining agreement" on the otlher. 02 A large grey area
lay in between these two ends of the spectrum, Judge Dorsey opined,
identified by the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers as those cases to
be tested by whether the claim "exist[s] independent of any rights
established by the contract" or "is inextricably intertwined with con-
99. Paradis v. United Technologies, 672 F. Supp. 67 (D. Conn. 1987).
100. Id. at 68.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 69. The court cited a claim of unjust termination, brought by an employee covered
by a collective bargaining agreement containing a just cause provision, as illustrative of a claim
"indisputedly linked" to the contract, and a claim by an employee alleging assault by the employer
as illustrative of a claim "completely independent and unrelated to" the contract. Id.
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sideration of the terms of the contract."1 3 Employing the "line spec-
trum" analysis, the Court found that Paradis' claim of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy stated a claim governed by
the just cause provision of the contract, and was, therefore, inti-
mately bound up with the collective bargaining agreement. 1' How-
ever, the claim that the company disciplined and discriminated against
him for exercising his right to privacy and free speech under Con-
necticut law was held to assert rights guaranteed to employees by
the state, existing wholly separate from those rights provided by the
labor contract, and therefore, was not preempted. Paradis' claim
of emotional distress caused by the employer's harassment of him
for refusing to divulge the names of other drug users was also held
to exist independent of the collective bargaining agreement, which
did not address or redress such conduct, 105 and was therefore, not
preempted. The Court distinguished, however, Paradis' claim for
emotional distress caused by the act of discharging him, which as-
serted matters encompassed by the collective bargaining agreement,
and held it to be preempted and properly removed to federal court. 10 6
The Court ruled that the remaining claims of estoppel, fraud, deceit
and misrepresentation fell within the grey "Allis-Chalmers" area of
the spectrum, and the question of their preemption and the propriety
of their removal from state court depended upon the specific facts
upon which the claims relied. Because Paradis alleged that the em-
ployer breached promises it made to him independent of the col-
lective bargaining agreement, they were not preempted. 0 7
103. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213).
104. Id. at 69-70.
105. Id. at 71. (citing Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1987). cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 251 (1987)).
106. Id. at 69-70.
107. Id. at 71 (citing Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425).
In deciding the preemptive effect of the LMRA on the various claims asserted in the Paradis
complaint, the district court was mindful of the disagreement among the circuits in applying the
doctrine to state court claims and carving out standards to determine where exceptions exist. Id. (citing
Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1987)). Id. at 70 (citing
Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing confusion
in the labor preemption area)). Id. at 71 n.7 (citing Martin v. Associated Truck Lines, 801 F.2d 246
(6th Cir. 1986); Bale v. General Tel. Co., 795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1986); Gibson v. A.T.T. Technologies,
782 F.2d 686 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3275 (1986) (claims of misrepresentation and
fraud preempted under § 301 of the LMRA); Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 803 F.2d 953 (8th Cir.
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An employer's accusation against an employee of drug use gave
rise to the Ninth Circuit case of Tellez v. Pacific Gas and Electric
Co.1°8 in which a unionized employee, Tellez, brought state tort claims
against the employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and defamation, for cir-
culating a letter among company managers accusing him of pur-
chasing cocaine on the job. Prior to bringing the cause of action,
Tellez had filed a grievance over the company's decision to suspend
him for allegedly purchasing drugs, and obtained from the arbitrator
an order expunging the suspension record from his personnel file
and awarding him back pay. 19 The state tort claims, which attacked
the contents of the letter and its circulation among various company
managers, were removed to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, which entered summary judgment
for the company on the ground that the tort claims were preempted
by Section 301 of the LMRA. 110 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed, finding that Tellez's state court claims sought redress for
employer conduct which was not addressed, and could not be rem-
edied, by any provisions of the collective bargaining agreement."'In
holding that Tellez' claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress was not preempted, the Ninth Circuit observed that the labor
agreement in that case contained no terms under which an arbitrator
could determine whether the company had acted outrageously in
circulating the letter, nor any remedy for such behavior even as-
suming an arbitral finding could be made.1 2 In so concluding, the
Court distinguished earlier Ninth Circuit cases of Truex v. Garrett
Freight Lines, Inc. 3 and Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co.,114
in which it had held that a unionized employee's state tort claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted by
1986). cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3242 (1987); Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 668 F. Supp. 461 (D. Md.
1987) (misrepresentation and fraud claims not preempted by § 301)).
108. Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
251 (1987).
109. Id. at 537.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 538.
112. Id. at 539.
113. Truex v. Garrett Freight Lines, 784 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1985).
114. Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1984).
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Section 301 where the collective bargaining agreement specified when
and how discipline could be administered, and addressed the em-
ployment and work conditions being challenged.1
15
If the company's conduct is outrageous or particularly abusive,
it may give rise to a state tort claim which survives preemption, even
if the conduct took place during a disciplinary investigation under
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. In Penrith v. Lock-
heed Corp. ,116 the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California would not preempt a state tort claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff-employee alleged
that company security guards, in the course of searching his vehicle,
uncovered a shotgun and aimed it at him, causing fright. Also, the
complaint alleged that the company's "employee assistance pro-
gram" personnel divulged confidential information about the plain-
tiff in a manner that was particularly abusive, that is, malicious,
oppressive, and done with a conscious disregard for his rights and
feelings." 7
115. Tellez, 817 F.2d at 539. See also Scott v. Machinists Automotive Trades Dist. Lodge No.
190, 827 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1987) (terminated employee's state tort claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and defamation were preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA, where emotional
distress claim attacking supervisor's conduct concerned working conditions and disciplinary procedures
covered by labor agreement, and defamation claim attacking statements made in employer's disci-
plinary investigation. Tort claims relied on matters inextricably intertwined with the contract's griev-
ance machinery). Id. at 594. The Scott court distinguished the Tellez case, as the allegedly defamatory
statements in Tellez were not made in the course of the collective bargaining agreement's mandated
grievance procedure and the contract did not address disciplinary formalities. Id.
116. Penrith v. Lockheed Corp., 1 Individ. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 760 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
117. Id. at 762. However, the Court stressed that any state court challenge to the disciplinary
investigation or administration of the employee assistance program, itself, would be preempted. Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the collective bargaining agreement, under § 301, preempted plaintiff's
state tort claims for false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, negligence,
negligent hiring, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress to the extent that
the claims raised matters grievable under the contract.
See also Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways, 825 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1987) (state tort claims against
employer for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress not preempted where
underlying conduct complained of is particularly abusive and resolution of claim is not dependent
on interpretation of collective bargaining agreement. The Seventh Circuit rejected the company's ar-
gument that Keehr's claims were preempted because he could have filed a grievance against the su-
pervisor for using abusive language. Id. at 136. The court opined,
[t]he mere fact that [Keehr] might be able to grieve [the supervisor's] conduct under pro-
cedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement is not sufficient in itself to conclude
that [his] tort claims are preempted. The crucial issue under Allis-Chalmers is not whether
a claim can be taken through the grievance process but whether the state law tort claim
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A unionized employee's state tort claim may also survive a pre-
emption defense where the clam implicates public policy. In Mes-
senger v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 1 8 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia held that a un-
ionized employee's state tort action of retaliatory discharge for filing
a workers' compensation claim would not be preempted by Section
301 on the ground that the wrong which the tort action sought to
redress was not the act of discharging, but the employer's contra-
vention of public policy in carrying out the discharge."t 9 Thus, if
the unionized employee can persuade the court that the state claim
brought in connection with employer substance testing asserts mat-
ters of important public policy, which should not be frustrated by
the exercise of a collective bargaining agreement, the claim might
survive preemption.120
being asserted purports to give meaning to the term of the labor contract.
Id. at 137 (upheld jury award of $50,000 in punitive damages)); Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d
703 (5th Cir. 1985) (state tort claim for defamation against employer for suspending employee for
suspected drug use preempted unless employee could show that employer acted with malice); Cooper
v. Communication Workers, 2 Individ. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 881, 883 (D.D.C., 1987) (unionized
employees' cause of action against employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress not pre-
empted where complaint alleged facts indicating that employer's conduct was outrageous).
118. Messenger v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.W. Va. 1984).
119. Id. at 570. There is considerable disagreement among the various jurisdictions as to the
right of an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement to bring a state court action for
retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim. Some courts recognize that the public
policy embodied in such an action should protect all workers, and the retaliatory discharge claim
may not be preempted by the presence of a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Peabody Galion
v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); Herring v. Prince Macaroni of New Jersey, Inc., 799 F.2d
120 (3d Cir. 1986): Baldracchi, 814 F.2d 102. Other jurisdictions hold that a retaliatory discharge
action brought, under a workers' compensation statute, is not available to employees who have the
protection of a collective bargaining agreement containing a "just cause" provision. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Hussman Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 823 F.2d
1031 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987) (specifically rejecting state court decision
of Gonzalez v. Prestress Eng'g Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 308 (1986) holding that workers'
compensation statute's prohibition against retaliatory discharge effectuated public policy applicable
to all workers, regardless of union status); Clark v. Momence Pkg. Co., 637 F. Supp. 16 (C.D. I11.
1985); Cox v. United Technologies, 240 Kan. 95, 727 P.2d 456 (1986).
120. See also Paige v. Kaiser, 826 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) (claims brought under state laws
which exist to protect all workers, irrespective of their coverage by a labor agreement, may not be
preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367, 1375 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985) (unionized employee's action for wrongful termination
in violation of public policy, based on allegation that employer discharged him for refusing to deliver
spoiled milk to customers and for reporting employer's demand to local health department, not pre-
empted by § 301. Action did not simply attack discharge as wrongful, but attacked employer's un-
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Even where the state court claim brought by a unionized em-
ployee does not implicate public policy or alleged employer conduct
that is outrageous or particularly abusive, if the state action alleges
matters that do not derive from, or depend upon, interpretation of
the underlying collective bargaining agreement, it may escape the
preemptive effect of Section 301. Thus, in Tellez v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co.,121 the Ninth Circuit allowed an employee covered by
a collective bargaining agreement to bring a state claim against his
employer for circulating a letter accusing him of purchasing nar-
cotics, where the contract contained no provision which addressed
the employee's right to be free from publication of defamatory state-
ments.
The question of whether a state cause of action is preempted by
Section 301 of the LMRA is fact-intensive. As a general rule, courts
are reluctant to allow individuals covered by a collective bargaining
agreement to assert rights against their employers outside of the
contract's grievance arbitration procedure.122 Job applicants, or new
hires who are not yet covered by a collective bargaining agreement,
will most likely find courts receptive to state tort actions to redress
injuries caused by drug and alcohol testing because their claims are
derlying violation of state law as motivation for discharge.
A claim grounded in state law for wrongful termination for public policy reasons poses no
significant threat to the collective bargaining process; it does not alter the economic re-
lationship between the employer and the employee. The remedy is in tort, distinct from
any contractual remedy an employee might have under the collective bargaining agreement.
It furthers the state's interest in protecting the general public-an interest which transcends
the employment relationship.
Id. at 1375; Bureau of Lab. Stds v. Fort Halifax Pkg. Co., 510 A.2d 1054 (Me. 1986), aff'd 107 S.
Ct. 2211 (1987) (National Labor Relations Act will not preempt unionized employee's state law action
for severance pay pursuant to state statute, notwithstanding the existence of a collective bargaining
agreement which failed to provide for severance pay. State has the authority to enact a law of general
application reflecting public policy determination to protect its citizens from economic dislocation,
regardless of their union status. Contra Smith v. Greyhound Lines, 614 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Pa.
1984), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1986) (state tort claim for wrongful discharge arising out of
employer-administered polygraph test, available only to at-will employees, and may not be brought
by employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement).
121. Tellez, 817 F.2d 536.
122. See, e.g., Truex, 784 F.2d 1347, Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 824 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1987);
Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Co., 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987); Mann v. Georgia Pac. Corp. 651
F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Ark. 1986); Jeffers v. Convoy, 650 F. Supp. 315 (D. Minn. 1986); Cooper, 2
Individ. EmpI. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 881.
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least likely to be arbitrable. 2 1 A union seeking to bring state action
in its own name, on behalf of members injured by substance testing,
may find the courts less receptive to such actions and more ready
to insist that the union settle the matter through the labor arbitration
forum established by the contract. 124 The bargaining unit employee
who brings a state tort action on his or her own behalf against the
employer for drug or alcohol screening, or the related investigation,
may successfully overcome the preemptive effect of Section 301 if
he or she asserts matters of outrageous or particularly abusive em-
ployer conduct, matters that do not look to the collective bargaining
agreement or the bargaining relationship for resolution, or matters
that implicate public policy or assert rights under state law applicable
to all employees, regardless of union status. Because a tort action
may yield considerable monetary damages, it is a potent shield against
employer abuse. In protecting workers from injury to character,
reputation, privacy, mental and emotional well-being, and liveli-
hood, unions may find it useful to educate their representatives and
members as to this strategic area of the law, and assist them in
preparing the appropriate litigation.
C. Liability Under Discrimination Statutes
A variety of federal and state statutes protect workers from em-
ployer discrimination. The National Labor Relations Act prohibits
an employer from discriminating against employees with respect to
hire or tenure, or condition of employment, because of their union
membership or activity. 125 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
protects individuals against employer discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 6 The Federal Voca-
tional Rehabilitation Act prohibits employment discrimination against
the handicapped by the federal government, federal contractors and
subcontractors, and employers or employment programs receiving
123. Allis-Chalmers, 417 U.S. 202; Anderson, 803 F.2d 953; Varnum v. Nu-Car Carriers, 804
F.2d 638 (1th Cir. 1986); reh'g denied, 808 F.2d 1524, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2181 (1987).
124. See, e.g., Association of W. Pulp & Paper Workers v. Boise Cascade Corp., 644 F. Supp.
183 (D,. Or. 1986).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1982).
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federal financial assistance. 27 Most states have enacted their own
statutes extending similar protections to their citizens. 128
The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") makes it unlawful
for an employer to discharge or discriminate against employees for
engaging in union activity. 12 If a company policy or work rule,
neutral on its face, is enforced more stringently against union rep-
resentatives or activists, it will violate the NLRA.
In NLRB v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons13 ° the Board held, and the
United States District Court for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, that the
discharge of an employee for possession of marijuana violated the
National Labor Relations Act, where the purpose of the discharge
was to retaliate against the individual for his support of the union
and was not consistent with the company's treatment of other em-
ployees with records of drug use.131 Presumably, a substance screen-
ing program which is imposed disparately upon union representatives
or activists will be unlawful.
A drug screening program or drug policy which is not prom-
ulgated with a discriminatory intent and is not discriminatorily ap-
plied will most likely not violate Title VII. Disparate application of
a substance-abuse policy may, however, violate the statute. 32 The
United States Supreme Court applied the prohibitions against racial
and ethnic discrimination under Title VII 33 to an employer-prom-
ulgated drug screening program in New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer. 3 4 In that case, the New York City Transit Authority main-
127. 29 U.S.C. § 701-96; (1982).
128. See infra notes 143-152.
129. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB. 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954).
130. NLRB v. Decker & Sons, 636 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1981), enforcing 244 N.L.R.B. 875 (1979).
131. See also Laredo Coca Cola Bottling Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 491, 501 (1981) (refusal to reinstate
striker convicted of marijuana possession did not violate National Labor Relations Act, even if policy
to deny employment to drug users did not exist prior to strike, where employer offered reinstatement
to other strikers and did not enforce new policy in a discriminatory manner).
132. Drayton v. City of St. Petersburg, 477 F. Supp. 846, 885 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1982).
134. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, that the Authority's refusal to employ persons who use methadone
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 399 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y 1975),
aff'd, 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977). In a supplemental opinion allowing the recovery of attorneys fees,
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tained a policy of excluding from employment individuals testing
positive for narcotics use. Consistent with the policy, the Authority
refused employment to persons on a methadone maintenance pro-
gram. Notwithstanding statistical evidence that approximately sixty-
five percent of all methadone-maintained persons in New York City
were black and Hispanic, and that eighty percent of the employees
referred to the Transit Authority's medical consultant for suspected
violation of its drug policy were black or Hispanic, the Supreme
Court rejected the finding of the District Court that the statistics
proved a violation of Title VII.'35 The Court noted that even if the
statistical evidence were capable of establishing a prima facie case
of discrimination, the Authority would have successfully rebutted
by demonstrating that the narcotics rule carried out "legitimate em-
ployment goals of safety and efficiency requir[ing] the exclusion of
all users of illegal narcotics, barbiturates, and amphetamines, and
of a majority of all methadone users."'13 6 Although the Court re-
jected the contention that the narcotics policy discriminated against
blacks and Hispanics, it did not reject the proposition that such
employment policy could, under the appropriate facts, disparately
impact on a protected group.
The Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits dis-
crimination by the federal government, federal contractors or sub-
contractors, or any program or activity receiving federal assistance
against a handicapped individual whose disability does not render
him or her unable to perform the work at issue. 37 Generally, an
employer will not be subject to the statute unless it receives some
the district court further held that the Authority's narcotics policy violated Title VII. 414 F. Supp.
277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The Supreme Court, in addition to ruling on the Title VII claim, held that the
employment policy did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment on the
ground that the policy was rationally related to the Authority's perception that as long as an individual
was undergoing methadone treatment, the uncertainties associated with the rehabilitation of heroin
addicts persisted. 440 U.S. at 591-594.
135. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584 n.25. The Supreme Court faulted the usefulness of the statistics
in proving a violation of Title VII, because although the figures might demonstrate a discriminatory
effect of the Authority's narcotics policy on blacks and Hispanics, plaintiffs had failed to present a
discriminatory purpose in promulgating or effectuating the policy.
136. Id. at 587 n.31.
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subsidy or funds from the federal government."' Tax exemptions
or credits will not, by themselves, bring an employer within the
jurisdiction of the Rehabilitation Act.
139
Handicapped individuals, as defined by Section 7(7)(B) of the
Act, 40 do not include persons whose current use of alcohol or drugs
prevents them from performing the duties of their job or whose
drug or alcohol use creates a direct threat to the property or safety
of others. Persons who are active drug or alcohol users will not find
protection under the Rehabilitation Act as handicapped individuals
if the substance dependency interferes with their work performance,
particularly if they refuse to stop drinking or taking drugs and un-
dergo treatment.' 4' However, individuals who have recovered from
drug or alcohol dependency have successfully sued their employers
for discrimination under the statute. 142
The majority of states have passed legislation protecting em-
ployees from discrimination based on handicap by private-sector em-
ployers. Alabama, 43  Colorado 144  Kentucky, 145  Ohio,1 46
Pennsylvania, 47 and Tennessee.148 Illinois 49 and West Virginia'50 have
enacted statutes which specifically recognize drug and alcohol de-
138. Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm., 704 F.2d 1402 reh'g denied,
709 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1983); Martin v. Delaware Law School, 625 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Del. 1985).
139. Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 628 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
141. Crewe v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 834 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1987); McCleod v. City of
Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
142. Tench v. Walters, 765 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987);
Traynor v. Waters, 606 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); rev'd, 791 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1368 (1987); Athanas v. Board of Educ., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 569
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
143. ALA. CODE § 21-7-8 (1975).
144. Colo. Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957, CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 24-34-401 to -406 (1973);
Colo. Substantive Rules Prohibiting Discrimination on Account of Physical Handicap 60.1-60.2 (1980),
reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 453:1111 (1988).
145. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.130-207.240 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982).
146. OHio REv. CODE ANN. tit. 41, § 4112.01-4112.11 (Anderson 1980).
147. Pa. Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951-963 (1964 & Supp. 1987).
148. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-50-103 to -104 (1980).
149. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-101 to 2-105 (Supp. 1987).
150. W. Va. Human Rights Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1987).
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pendency as handicaps protected under their discrimination laws.''
Several other state courts have interpreted their handicap discrim-
ination statutes as protecting substance-dependent individuals from
discrimination. 152
D. Liability Under Health and Safety Statutes
Section 105(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act' 53 pro-
hibits an employer from discriminating against any miner, or miner's
representative, for exercising his or her rights under the statute, in-
cluding the filing of complaints. The Occupational Safety and Health
Act 54 contains similar prohibitions against employer discrimination.
A coal operator, or other employer, who administers drug or alcohol
tests in a discriminatory manner, for instance, by selecting for testing
safety representatives or workers who aggressively pursue their right
to a safe work environment, risks liability under the statute. 155
Where a worker is discharged because of drug or alcohol use,
the individual may qualify for workers' compensation benefits if he
or she can show that the substance use constitutes an industrial
illness within the meaning of the particular state statute.
151. Illinois law recognizes drug and alcohol abuse as handicaps where the person demonstrates
that the "condition" arises from or constitutes the equivalent of a disease or functional disorder.
Illinois Interpretive Rules on Handicap Discrimination in Employment, ILL. ADmIN. CODE tit. 56, §
2500.20(c) (1984), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 453:2741 (1988).
Under West Virginia law, drug and alcohol use may constitute a protected handicap where the
person can demonstrate a medically verifiable addiction. West Virginia Interpretive Rules Governing
Discrimination on the Handicapped, § 2.04 (1982), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA)
457:3068f (1988).
152. Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet. Inc., 25 Ohio St. 3d 279, 469 N.E.2d 478 (1986); Consolidated
Freightways v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Comm'n., 366 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 1985): Athansas, 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 569.
153. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982).
155. The Secretary of Labor recently issued a complaint under § 105(c) of the Mine Safety &
Health Act against Jim Walters Resources for instituting a drug screening program which selected
safety committeemen for random testing. Jim Walters Resources, Inc. v. Mine Safety & Health Rev.
Comm'n, No. 87-7484 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 1987). After Jim Walter Resources discharged two safety
committeemen for failing to provide urine samples, the Secretary of Labor sought their temporary
reinstatement with back pay. The Administrative Law Judge so ordered, and the Mine Safety and
Health Commission affirmed. The order of temporary reinstatement has been appealed by the company
to the Eleventh Circuit. 40
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In West Virginia, a worker is entitled to compensation for oc-
cupational diseases developed in the course of, or as a result of,
employment. 56 A pre-existing condition will not necessarily bar an
employee from recovery workers' compensation under West Virginia
law if the disease can be shown to have developed to its present
state as a result of the employment. 5 7 In Hall v. State Workmen's
Comp. Comm'r,15 8 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
upheld an award of workers' compensation to the widow of a worker
whose suicide was shown to be related to mental depression arising
from an injury sustained in the course of employment. 5 9 The Court
adopted the "chain of causation" rule whereby an employee's su-
icide which arises in the course of, and results from, covered em-
ployment is compensable under the state workers' compensation
statute. 160 Arguably, a worker who forms a drug or alcohol de-
pendency arising from an injury sustained in employment will have
a compensable claim for the dependency.
At least one court has held that alcoholism resulting from job-
related stress qualifies as an occupational disease compensable under
the state's workers' compensation laws. In California Microwave,
Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., the California Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board awarded benefits to an employee who
became totally disabled as a result of alcoholism caused by job-
related tension. The employee introduced evidence that the workload
was unduly burdensome, that his request to the company for ad-
ditional staff was refused, and that the stress caused by those work-
ing conditions results in his increased alcohol consumption,
culminating over time in organic brain damage. 62 Significantly, the
fact that he was a recovered alcoholic when he began employment
with the company, that is, that he had a pre-existing alcoholic con-
dition, did not bar his recovery.
156. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1985).
157. Jordan v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 156 W. Va. 159, 191 S.E.2d 497 (1972).
158. Hall v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 303 S.E.2d 726, 730 (W. Va. 1983).
159. Id. at 728.
160. Id. at 730.
161. California Microwave, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 45 Cal. Comp. Cas. 125 (Ct.
App. 1980).
162. Id. at 126.
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If an employer-administered substance test results in the dis-
charge of an employee, that individual may have a viable claim for
workers' compensation if he or she can show that the alcohol or
drug consumption qualifies as an occupational disease or illness. To
do that, the employee most likely will have to introduce evidence
of causation between employment conditions (including prior in-
juries sustained in the course of employment), and the substance
use. The argument should be particularly persuasive where the drug
dependency is medicinal, that is, is the result of drugs prescribed
by a physician to ease pain due to an injury sustained at work, or
drugs to ease nervous tension caused by the employment environ-
ment. The same theory may be put forward to argue that an em-
ployee absent from work to undergo treatment and rehabilitation
should be covered by the anti-discrimination provision of the work-
ers compensation statute, prohibiting the employer from retaliating
against a worker due to occupational injury or disease. 163
V. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES THROUGH COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
Employees who are represented by a union not only have liti-
gation avenues to resort to when faced with mandatory drug testing
programs, but may protect their rights at the collective bargaining
table, as well. Through the negotiation process, unions can limit the
ability of employers to test workers, protect them from false ac-
cusation, and develop rules that provide their members with a set
of reasonable expectations in connection with employer testing de-
mands. Most importantly, collective bargaining gives the union and
employer the opportunity to protect everyone's interest in a safe and
productive workplace by developing employee assistance programs
to help employees overcome a variety of problems which affect job
performance, whether emotional, situational, or drug and alcohol
related. The following sections discuss the duty of the parties to
negotiate in good faith, and programs arrived at by various unions
163. But see Boise Cascade Corp., 644 F. Supp. at 185 (mandatory drug testing program of
employees injured or involved in accidents does not violate Oregon Workers' Compensation statute
prohibiting discrimination against employees who apply for benefits, where program disciplines for
drug use onl', and not for applying for benefits or filling out accident reports).
[Vol. 90
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and companies which intelligently approach the issue of drugs in
the workplace.
A. The Duty to Bargain
The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has
issued a memorandum on drug and alcohol testing' 64 which takes
the position that drug testing for both current employees and job
applicants is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The General Coun-
sel believes that generally, implementation of a drug testing program
is a substantial change in working conditions, even where physical
examinations are permitted under the collective bargaining agree-
ment and/or previously have been given, and even if established
work rules preclude the use or possession of drugs in the plant. The
Board will apply to drug testing cases its established policy that a
union waiver of its bargaining rights must be clear and unmistakable.
Finally, normal Board deferral policies to labor arbitration, as set
forth in Dubo Mfg. Corp.165 and Collyer Insulated Wire, 66 will apply
to these cases, but that where Section 10(j) injunctive relief is war-
ranted, the Board may exercise its discretion not to defer.
According to the General Counsel's memorandum, an employer
will not succeed in unilaterally implementing a drug testing program
under the guise of the contract's labor management clause, or any
other provision of the contract which does not deal squarely with
the drug testing program at issue. 67
Applying general principles of waiver developed under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("Act"), if the issue of substance testing
was not discussed during contract negotiations and is not embodied
in the contract, the employer will not be permitted to unilaterally
institute a program during the term of the contract without bar-
gaining. 6 18 If, during contract negotiations, the union and company
164. NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem. 87-5 (Sept. 8, 1987), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
184, at D-I (Sept. 24, 1987) [hereinafter NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem.].
165. Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963), supplemented by 148 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1964),
enforced, 353 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965).
166. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
167. NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem., supra note 164, at D-1.
168. NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
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discuss substance testing, but the subject is not included in the re-
sulting collective bargaining agreement, the Board will find that the
union has not waived its right to bargain during the term of the
agreement unless it "consciously yielded" its position. 169 The union
will have consciously yielded its position in bargaining only if the
matter of dispute was "fully discussed or consciously explored.' 170
If the union has been put on notice during negotiations that the
company intends to implement a, substance screening program, it
will be incumbent upon it to request bargaining or a waiver may
be inferred.' 7  Simply protesting the change without demanding to
bargain may constitute waiver by inaction. 72 However, the em-
ployer's notice must be clear and unequivocal. If the employer has
not openly declared its intent to change the status quo, the union
will not be expected to demand bargaining in response to the mere
possibility that the company might take action in the future. 73
Waiver by past practice may be found where the practice "clearly
encompass[es] the program at issue. ' 174 Thus, the past practice of
requiring applicants or current employees to submit to physical ex-
aminations that have not included drug testing will not create a
waiver. 75 Similarly, a work rule prohibiting the use or possession
of drugs on company premises will also not constitute past practice
sufficient to waive the bargaining obligation. Even where the union
169. New York Mirror, 151 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965).
170. Press Company, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 976 (1958).
171. Love's Barbeque Restaurant, 245 N.L.R.B. 78 (1979).
172. NLRB Gen. Couns. Mem., supra note 164, at D-2.
173. In Vogt Mach, Co., 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1088 (1980) the Board held that an employer
violated the Act when, after executing the contract, it unilaterally discontinued its practice of allowing
employees to eat in a particular lunch room. The collective bargaining negotiations did not amount
to a waiver, the Board found, even though employees had expressed their fears to the union during
negotiations that the employer would take such action. Because the company had not announced its
intention to unilaterally alter the status quo, the Board held that the union was not under an obligation
to request bargaining simply based on "the employees' speculations and conjectures," but was entitled
to await the company's actions. The Board noted that the union had not been given clear and un-
equivocal notice of the employer's proposed changes and therefore did not consciously relinquish
lunch room privileges. Id. at 1089.
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has agreed to drug testing "for cause," the employer may not uni-
laterally implement random testing.
176
Thus, if the company does not raise the issue of drug testing or
treatment at the bargaining table, the union will not be under an
obligation to do so, and its failure to raise the issue will not con-
stitute a waiver of the right to bargain over the subject in the future.
If the company simply raises the issue of drug testing in an am-
biguous manner which does not indicate its intention to make drug
testing, or rehabilitation, a condition of employment, the union again
has no duty to bargain over the matter. However, if the company
raises drug testing or treatment in concrete terms, particularly if it
voices an intent to implement a program, the union will have the
duty to bargain in order to avoid creating the inference of a waiver.
The NLRB General Counsel has recognized that drug testing cre-
ates a substantial change in working conditions where it carries the
potential for discipline or discharge. This is so even where there is
an existing physical examination program because drug testing "sub-
stantially changes the nature and fundamental purpose of the ex-
isting physical examination.' ' 77 As the General Counsel's
Memorandum explains:
Generally, a physical examination is designed to test physical fitness to perform
the work. A drug test is designed to determine whether an employee or applicant
uses drugs, irrespective of whether such usage interferes with the ability to per-
form. In addition, it is our view that a drug test is not simply a work rule -
rather, it is a means of policing and enforcing compliance with a rule. There is
a critical distinction between a rule against drug usage and the methodology used
to determine whether the rule is being broken. Moreover, a drug test is intrinsically
different from other means of enforcing legitimate work rules in the degree to
which it may be found to intrude into the employee being tested or raise questions
of test procedures, confidentiality, laboratory integrity, etc. 118
Finally, the General Counsel's determination that the duty to
bargain over drug testing extends not only to bargaining unit em-
ployees but to new hires and applicants as well is rooted in long-
176. Id. Compare Gulf Coast Automotive Warehouse, 256 N.L.R.B. 486 (1981) wherein the
Board held that the employer was not obligated to bargain over the requirement that employees submit
to polygraph tests where the company had an established practice of administering the tests.
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standing Board law. 179 The General Counsel's Memorandum cites
numerous cases in which the Board has found the duty to bargain
about conditions of attaining employment, including Pattern Mak-
ers' Assn. of Detroit'80 (holding that the obligation to bargain at-
tached to the subject of referral procedures utilized in a hiring hall
arrangement), and Lockheed Shipbldg. & Constr. Co.,18' (holding
that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act by unilaterally implementing a medical screening pro-
gram for the purpose of denying employment to new hires).
Commensurate with the duty to negotiate over a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining is the duty to furnish related information. 18 2 Given
the complexity of structuring a substance testing or employee as-
sistance program, a union negotiating either of these programs will
most likely seek, and be entitled to, information regarding proce-
dures testing or rehabilitation procedures, adequacy of facilities, and
competency of the personnel engaged in testing or counseling.
More specifically, if the employer proposes instituting substance
testing of current employees, new hires, or applicants, the union
may consider requesting information as to:
179. The duty to bargain over conditions for denying employment to applicants should be dis-
tinguished from the duty to bargain over conditions for employing permanent strike replacements.
In LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 124 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1398 (1986), the NLRB Division of Advice
directed the dismissal of Section 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) charges filed by the United Autoworkers alleging
that the employer unlawfully failed to bargain over the administration of drug testing to strike re-
placements. Relying on previous case law, the Division of Advice asserted that "it is well-settled Board
law that an employer need not bargain with an incumbent union with respect to the terms and
conditions of employment under which permanent strike replacements are to be hired." The Mem-
orandum noted, however, that the company had not implemented the drug screening plan as to all
applicants, but only as to strike replacements, and that it had made clear to the union its willingness
to bargain over the plan's application to both current and prospective employees. Id. at 1399.
180. Pattern Makers' Ass'n of Detroit, 233 N.L.R.B. 430, 435-36 (1977), enforced in relevant
part, 622 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1980).
181. Lockheed Shipbldg. & Constr. Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 171 (1984). The Board modified the
Administrative Law Judge's order that the employer bargain over implementation of the screening
program for applicants and/or new employees, on the ground that the union had reached an earlier
understanding with the employer that the company could use medical screening for the purpose of
establishing baseline data for new employees and for the purpose of properly placing new employees
in jobs consistent with their medical limitations. Accordingly, the Board limited the order to bargaining
over administration of the screening process for the purpose of denying employment to applicants
or terminating new hires.
182. S-G Metal Indus., 256 N.L.R.B. 416 (1981).
[Vol. 90
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(1) the types of tests the company would seek to utilize and all data or studies
compiled by the company in connection with each test's rate of accuracy and
cost;
(2) the type of test the company would seek to utilize for confirmation purposes
and its rate of accuracy and costs;
(3) the safeguards the company would employ to ensure that the privacy of the
individual employee is preserved;
(4) the basis for the company's belief that the work force suffers from drug or
alcohol-related performance problems (if it holds such a view), including hard
data supporting that belief;
(5) any studies or surveillance undertaken by the company of bargaining unit
employees suspected of substance abuse, including supervisory or managerial re-
ports;
(6) the training which supervisors have undergone, or would undergo, to make
judgments concerning work performance problems which are drug-related;
(7) any data the company has compiled with respect to work place injuries and/
or accidents, absenteeism, or other job-related problems which the company be-
lieves relate to substance abuse, and the basis for its belief that substance abuse
is the cause;
(8) any studies or copies of other substance testing programs which the company
has used as a model or guide for its proposed program;
(9) the procedures the company would employ to ensure proper labeling and chain
of custody of samples;
(10) the procedure the company would employ to obtain test samples (e.g., if a
urine sample were taken would the employee urinate while observed or unob-
served? If observed, who would be the observer? Where would the test be ad-
ministered?); and
(11) the identity of medications, prescription or otherwise, which the employer
considers to interfere with work performance.
Because the employer will most likely send test samples to a
laboratory for analysis, the union's information request may seek
to determine:
(1) the identity of the lab the company would utilize;
(2) the number of years the lab has operated;
(3) the annual volume of drug testing it performs;
(4) the number of tests annually which have resulted in "false positive" or "false
negative" results;
(5) the analytical methods employed for the sensitivity and specificity of tested
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substances;
(6) whether the lab splits samples for confirmation testing, the type of test utilized
for confirmation testing, and the method employed for storing the split sample;
(7) the minimum concentration of each substance the lab deems "positive" for
each type of test employed;
(8) the procedures used to differentiate between test results which indicate sub-
stance use and those which indicate impairment as a result of substance use;
(9) the procedures used to differentiate between test results that show the time
at which the substance was ingested or inhaled;
(10) the lab's quality control program, including the procedures it utilizes to ensure
proper labeling and chain of custody and the safeguards it maintains to prevent
tampering;
(11) the identity, education, and training of the lab's employees;
(12) the procedures employed by the lab to ensure the confidentiality of the sam-
ples' identity and the test results; and
(13) whether the lab permits the individual employee access to his or her sample
for the purpose of obtaining independent confirmation of test results.
If the employer has proposed instituting a substance-abuse re-
habilitation program (which may be referred to as an "employee
assistance program" or "EAP"), the union may also consider seek-
ing information regarding:
(1) the identity of the organization or facility to which the employer would refer
employees for assistance;
(2) the proximity of the treatment facility to the workplace (is it easily accessible
to employees?);
(3) the availability of out-patient and in-patient treatment and aftercare programs;
(4) the length of time the facility or organization has been operational, the number
of persons it treats annually, and its rate of success;
(5) the availability of family counseling;
(6) the identity, education, and training of the facility's personnel; and
(7) the safeguards employed by the facility to ensure patient privacy and con-
fidentiality."'
3
The employer's failure to bargain over a drug-testing program
may result in the Board ordering the company to revoke all aspects
183. The list of inquiries set forth herein is by no means exhaustive. It merely suggests some
of the information relevant to the subjects of substance testing or treatment programs.
[Vol. 90
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of any program which it has instituted without bargaining and to
bargain in good faith to agreement or to impasse. The Board may
order reinstatement or recission of discipline, with backpay, for any
employees discharged or disciplined for refusing to submit to the
offending test.
184
The principles of NLRB deferral to labor arbitration, enunciated
in Collyer and Dubo, will be applied to cases charging violation of
the Act in connection with drug testing programs. However, because
deferral to arbitration is within the Board's discretion under Section
10(a) of the Act, 10(j) injunctive relief may not be sought unless a
complaint has issued. Thus, where 10(j) relief is appropriate, the
General Counsel's office will not defer to the arbitration process.' 85
The General Counsel has determined that "a Section 10(j) order
enjoining an employer from subjecting current unit employees to
unlawful, unilaterally implemented drug-testing programs may be
warranted where such implementation is demonstrably undermining
the union's ability to function effectively as the employees' bar-
gaining representative... " or " ... where implementation of the
drug testing program is unlawfully, discriminatorily applied - for
example, to union officers or other officers involved in grievance
adjustments."'1 86 Injunctive relief may also be appropriate where "a
Board order in due course will be unable to undo or provide an
effective remedy for employees' compelled submission to unlawful
drug testing." For example, injunctive relief may be warranted where
an employer "unlawfully implement(s) a highly invasive, random or
universal drug testing program under which all or a substantial num-
ber of the employer's current employees would be imminently af-
fected."1 87 Section 10(j) relief may be sought, if appropriate, upon
184. The Memorandum of the General Counsel instructs the Regions to seek the aforementioned
remedies in complaints issued pursuant to unlawful, unilateral implementation of drug testing pro-
grams. The General Counsel opines, however, that "it is not clear that such a remedy would be
appropriate for any employee disciplined or discharged for testing positive under a drug test," and
instructs the Regions to submit such cases to the NLRB Division of Advice. NLRB Gen. Couns.
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request of the union or other charging party or upon the Region's
own initiative. 188
B. Negotiating a Substance Testing Program and/or an
Employee Assistance Program
The Mining Industry Committee on Substance Abuse recognizes
drug and alcohol dependency as treatable illnesses, and urges the
mining industry to approach substance abuse as it would any other
safety or health issue. 189 The Committee focuses on employee as-
sistance programs as the primary means of reducing substance abuse
while returning the individual abuser to safe and gainful employ-
ment.
An approach to substance abuse which does not include treat-
ment and rehabilitation does the individual employee, the family,
and the community a disservice. By simply discharging an individual
who suffers from drug or alcohol dependency, the employer renders
a productive member of society (albeit a substance abuser) poten-
tially dependent upon unemployment compensation and welfare pro-
grams. Because of the damage done to the individual's reputation
and standing in the community, such a discharge may leave him or
her without future opportunity for gainful employment, potentially
fracturing the family unit as the stress of the circumstances takes
its toll. This further burdens community and local government re-
sources. Thus, logic suggests that substance testing and/or rehabil-
itation programs be negotiated as part of the employees' health and
welfare package. Ideally, the cost of treatment under the employee
assistance program agreed upon should be covered by the employee's
health insurance plan.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish substance testing from
substance rehabilitation. A testing program, standing alone, will not
treat the illness of drug or alcohol abuse and will not help the em-
ployee achieve greater productivity or safer working habits. Nor is
188. Id.
189. MINING INDUS. Co.mm. ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE, MINING INDUSTRY ALCOHOL AND DRUG RH-
SoURCEs MANUAL 4 (1987).
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substance rehabilitation dependent on substance testing. It is not the
positive test that creates the employee's need for assistance, for the
test result, by itself, will not differentiate between the casual user
and the substance-dependent individual. Rather, it is the perceptions
of the employee and the employer that the individual's work per-
formance problem is related to substance dependency that establishes
the need for an assistance program which can treat and rehabilitate
the illness.
Because the employer's interest in employees who are "drug free"
and "alcohol free" can only legitimately exist in conjunction with
its interest in a productive and safe workplace, the union may wish
to negotiate a program which recognizes not only drug and alcohol
abuse as sources of work performance problems but also recognizes
other emotional and behavioral problems for which assistance may
be extended. Not only does such a broad program achieve the goals
of productivity and safety, but it also requires the employer to deal
fairly with all employees who suffer from treatable problems which
affect job performance. For example, suppose employee Joe Smith
is experiencing decreased productivity, tardiness, and a general lack
of alertness due to substance dependency, while employee John Doe
is experiencing similar job-related problems due to depression or
nervous tension. An employee assistance program which provides
employees counseling, treatment, and continued employment for their
substance abuse but not for other emotional or situational problems
essentially would penalize John Doe for not being a drug abuser or
alcoholic.
A number of labor organizations have successfully negotiated
employee assistance programs which treat a broad range of sub-
stance-related, emotional, and behavioral problems in a manner which
promotes both the employer and the employee's interests and which
protects the employee's right to privacy and dignity. Of the unions
which have agreed to employer substance screening, many have ne-
gotiated programs which carefully restrict the employer's right to
invade the employee's personal life, protect the employee's right to
confidentiality, and guard the employee against false accusation.
Illustrative of a thoughtfully developed employee assistance pro-
gram, one which carefully focuses on helping employees overcome
1988]
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numerous types of problems which might interfere with their ability
to perform on the job, is the United Autoworkers-Ford Assistance
Plan, a collectively bargained-for program established jointly by the
UAW and Ford Company in 1984. The Plan, which is strictly con-
fidential and voluntary, is administered on a national level by an
equal number of union and management representatives who com-
prise a National Committee. The National Committee develops and
steers the treatment programs which are administered by an equal
number of union and management representatives on the individual
plant level.
The UAW-Ford Assistance Plan features a "problem resolution"
component and a "problem avoidance" component. 190 The problem
resolution program provides assistance to workers who are dealing
with existing personal difficulties. The problem avoidance program
helps workers deal with potential difficulties that may affect their
ability to perform productively and safely. Both programs are avail-
able to employees at no cost to themselves. Employees enter the
Plan either through self-referral or "job referral" by the local union
and management representatives who have met with the worker to
discuss his or her deteriorating job performance and have secured
the individual's voluntary agreement to obtain treatment. Where the
local Plan representatives confront a worker with poor job per-
formance, they may discuss the work-related problem with the em-
ployee, but they are not authorized to diagnose or attempt to solve
the employee's underlying personal problem. This function is prop-
erly reserved to the Assistance Plan. Participation in the Plan may
not adversely affect an employee's status. Rather, his or her em-
ployment status continues to be determined according to the same
standards imposed on the bargaining unit, generally.
Specifically, trained staff members assist employees with alcohol
and drug abuse problems and other emotional or physical problems
such as hypertension, stress, cigarette dependency, mental illness,
and family crisis. Drug and alcohol dependency are recognized as
health problems which may be successfully treated. The Plan has
190. UAW-Ford Employee Assistance Plan (Mar. 22, 1985).
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been so successful that some plant programs experience sixty to eighty
percent participation from self-referrals. The programs not only pro-
vide for rehabilitation but also for the critical aftercare necessary
to help the employee achieve stability.
Although the Plan is designed to treat employees suffering from
substance dependency, it does not have substance testing as a pre-
requisite or part of the program. Rather, its purpose is to assist
employees who perform poorly on the job for a variety of reasons.
Most importantly, it is not the employer, but the Assistance Plan,
with its privacy, its confidentiality, and its trained counselors, which
identifies the underlying cause of the worker's deteriorating job per-
formance. Thus, the company's objective of maintaining a produc-
tive, dependable work force is achieved without intruding upon the
employee's privacy, dignity, and reputation. 19'
Local No. 715 and Local 535, Service Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO, have also negotiated an employee assistance pro-
gram with the County of Santa Clara, California. The plan is avail-
able to bargaining unit members on a purely voluntary, confidential
basis and treats employees for not only drug and alcohol dependency
but also for a range of emotional and behavioral problems which
impact on the worker's ability to perform on the job. The program
is funded by the County at an annual rate of $10,000. Although
the program allows a supervisor to confront an employee with ev-
idence of deteriorating job performance, management may not di-
agnose the underlying cause. The program specifically provides that
an employee may not be disciplined or discharged for refusing to
enroll in the program. Rather, discipline and discharge may result
only in response to the employee's failure to improve his or her job
performance. If an employee does agree to obtain treatment, he or
she may use accumulated sick, vacation, and compensatory leave
for the absences necessary to participate in the program. Like the
UAW-Ford Assistance Plan, the union and the employer jointly
monitor the program. Drug testing is not a prerequisite or com-
ponent of treatment. 192
191. Id.
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Other unions, including Local 1635, American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees (City of Rochester, New
York), 93 and United Rubber Workers Union (Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company) have negotiated employee assistance programs
which treat not only substance abuse, but also a broad range of
personal problems which deter workers from conducting themselves
in a productive and safe manner. The programs are confidential and
are designed to improve workers' job performance. All the above-
mentioned programs satisfy the employer's objective of helping
workers achieve productive, reliable work habits. What they do not
do is allow the companies to privately police the lives of their em-
ployees. It is this critical aspect of the treatment programs, the em-
ployer's respect for the privacy and dignity of the individual
employee, and its recognition of what information it is entitled to
and what information should be directed to trained counselors in
a confidential environment, that makes the plans examples for both
union and industry. An approach to substance abuse rehabilitation
that does not recognize the limitations of an employer's right to
intrude into the personal life of the worker will not be well-received
by the adult men and women who comprise the work force and,
therefore, will not succeed.
Although drug testing is not a necessary part of an employee
assistance program, where employers are demanding substance test-
ing programs, unions are responding by demanding that such tests
be administered only under carefully proscribed circumstances.
The United Mine Workers of America has voiced its objections
to random drug testing and questioned the legitimacy of drug testing
generally for the same reasons we have discussed. The UMWA does
support, however, voluntary employee assistance programs which
assure the individual participant's privacy and confidentiality. 194
The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal em-
ployees has affirmed its opposition to random or massive drug test-
193. See Employee Assistance Programs: Making Them Work for Members, 4 Am. FD'N STATE,
CouNTY & MuN. EMPLOYEES No. 3 (1984).
194. Criteria for Evaluating Drug Testing of Miners, Presentation of Dr. James Weeks, 18th
Annual Inst. on Mine, Health, Safety & Research, Va. Poly. & St. U. (Aug. 25, 1987).
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ing of workers. Even where employer drug testing of an employee
is administered "for cause," AFSCME is opposed to its use as a
method for dealing with drug abuse. Instead, the union has insisted
that employers emphasize treatment and prevention. 195
The Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) has also issued a
statement opposing drug screening of flight attendants except where
the employer has "particularized probable cause."' 196 AFA has ex-
pressed doubts about the validity of drug testing, generally, and has
urged airline carriers to develop employee assistance programs which
address not only substance abuse but other problems which may
cause unsatisfactory work performance, as well. Like many other
unions, AFA rejects the notion that drug testing is a prerequisite
to drug treatment or that management has the authority to diagnose
the personal problems of its workers.
The International Machinists and Aerospace Workers has pub-
lished a guide to help its local representatives combat unfair drug
testing.' 97 The guide recommends that a negotiated drug testing pro-
gram permit testing of employees only where there is probable cause
to believe that substance abuse is the reason for impaired safety or
job performance. The guide also demands that the laboratory be
carefully investigated for its accuracy in test results, that confir-
mation testing be conducted on a "split sample" whenever a positive
test result is obtained, and that gas chromatography/mass spec-
trometry be the method utilized for confirmation. Further, testing
procedures should be clearly communicated to employees. The IAM
insists that drug testing be part of a larger program of rehabilitation
195. Ai. FED'N STATE, COUNTY & MuN. EMPLOYEES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT DRUG
TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE (1986).
196. ASs'N OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, EXPLANATION OF OPPOSITION TO DOT/FAA DRUG TESTING
PROPOSAL 3, 10-14 (1987).
197. INT'L Ass'N OF MACHINUSTS & AEROSPACE WORKERS, DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE,
UNION REPRESENTATIVES' GUIDE TO ISSUES AND STRATEGIES TO COMBAT UNFAIR DRUG TESTING (1986).
See also K. CONLAN, Workplace Drug Testing: A Union Reference Guide for Policy Making 8-10
(1986), which makes similar recommendations for negotiating a substance abuse program, but contains
additional suggestions such as subjecting all aspects of the program to the arbitration process, pro-
viding employees with independent access to test results and laboratory procedures utilized to perform
the analysis, placing the burden of verifying correct specimen ownership identification with the em-
ployer, and preserving to the union the right to demand a change in testing methods or laboratory
where information exists which challenges the accuracy of either.
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and that discipline for substance abuse be imposed in progressive
steps.
As these unions have shown, an employer's authority to test
employees for substance use can be limited through the bargaining
process. Although negotiating a "probable cause" standard may de-
ter an employer from arbitrary or discriminatory selection of em-
ployees for testing, the term "probable cause" will only provide
workers with meaningful protection if it is well-defined and easily
understood by a court or arbitrator. By carefully drawing parameters
around the phrase "probable cause," "reasonable suspicion," or
other similar limiting language, both the employer and the union
will save themselves endless dispute over its proper interpretation.
In addition, employees will have a reasonable expectation of the
circumstances under which they can be required to submit to testing.
By making all aspects of a substance abuse program, from testing
through referral for rehabilitation, subject to the contractual griev-
ance-arbitration procedure (or perhaps a specialized, expedited pro-
cedure), the union can monitor and check, on an ongoing basis, the
company's potential for violating the rights of its members.
Finally, the drug testing program and employee assistance pro-
gram agreed upon at the bargaining table need not be included in
the body of the collective bargaining agreement itself. Rather, it may
be memorialized in a memorandum of understanding, a letter be-
tween the parties, or some other side agreement. Because the area
of substance testing and substance rehabilitation by employers is an
emerging one, matters agreed upon presently may be better discarded
or modified in the future. Most likely, it will be easier to eliminate
and alter previous agreements between the union and the company
where those agreements have not become part and parcel of the
collective bargaining agreement. Given the volume of litigation, the
developing technology, and the "trial baloon" stage of many current
testing programs, it may be prudent to negotiate in a manner which
leaves optimum flexibility for change in the coming years.
VI. CONCLUSION
The concern for a safe and efficient workplace, free of the haz-
ards drug or alcohol abuse may create, is shared by employers,
[Vol. 90
56
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss3/8
SUBSTANCE TESTING
unions, and workers alike. There is much disagreement and debate
over the manner in which to achieve that goal. Testing seems, on
its face, to provide employers with a tool to eliminate substance
abuse and create a beneficial work environment. Closer analysis re-
veals that drug testing may create more problems than it solves.
Drug testing is so technically flawed and so vulnerable to human
error that it is of questionable value in providing accurate infor-
mation about the workforce. Because the tests cannot show the time
that the drug was consumed or impairment caused by the drug, as
a practical matter, it establishes the employer as a private police
force which uses testing to investigate whether an individual con-
sumes drugs at any time. The policing aspect of testing is particularly
sinister because it takes place outside of the democratic process,
away from the watchful eye of the citizenry which normally checks
such authority in the voting booth and in the halls of local gov-
ernment. The potential for false accusation against employees who
do not use illicit drugs is significant and should make employers
extremely cautious about using the less expensive, and less reliable,
tests on the market, such as EMIT and RIA. A cautious approach
should also be encouraged by the potential liability an employer
exposes itself to each time it demands that an employee submit to
drug screening.
If an employer is truly interested in helping workers to overcome
drug and alcohol related problems, employee assistance programs
can be developed which address a broad spectrum of problems. The
success the United Autoworkers and Ford Motor Company have had
at Ford plants speaks to the constructive impact that assistance plans
can have on worker safety and productivity. More importantly, they
illustrate that drug testing is not a necessary component of a pro-
gram that seeks to achieve a "drug free" workplace.
The increasing number of employers who subject their employees
to drug tests predictably will see a corresponding increase in lawsuits,
grievance/arbitration proceedings, and other responses by employees
and their unions in an effort to protect their rights and interests.
It is likely that the eagerness to drug test will be dampened by these
efforts and that the testing craze will give way to a more rational,
thoughtful approach to the issue of employee substance abuse. Dur-
19881
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ing this period of evolution, however, workers and unions which
are conversant with various litigation and collective bargaining strat-
egies will be better able to hold at bay company demands which do
not respect the worker.
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